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Office of Management and Budget (0MB) Circular A-76
established Federal policy concerning the performance of
commercial activities (CA). The Circular establishes
criteria for conducting cost comparison to determine
whether a CA is more economically performed by the
Government or by the private sector. Performance by the
private sector is accomplished through the formation of
contracts. The research of this study focused on the
suitability of fixed price award fee (FPAF) contracts for
private sector performance of commercial activities.
Research included a review of existing guidelines,
interviews with managers and policy makers, and
examination of four specific cases where FPAF contracts
were employed on an experimental basis to determine their
benefits and detriments. The study concludes that FPAF
contracts may be suitable, but that more fundamental
changes in the commercial activities program are
necessary and should precede wide use of FPAF contracts.
t03S/f
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For many years the Federal Government's policy has
held that it was in the national interest to rely to the
greatest extent possible upon private industry for goods
and services. In order to render support to the notion
that competitive private enterprise was important to
national economic health, the Office of Management and
Budget published OMB Circular A-76 on 3 March 1966, which
made reliance on private enterprise mandatory for
Government agencies except in such areas as national
security and the "act of governing."
While policy dictated that the Government rely on
private enterprise to the maximum extent practical,
industry's share of Federal budget outlays was shrinking
noticeably until the mid-1970's. At that time, federal
purchases of private goods and services became an issue
taken up in lobbying efforts by some industry groups.
For example, the Aerospace Industry Association contended
that as a percentage of the total federal budget, private
industry's share of outlays had dropped from 53*/. in 1965
to 3^y. in 1976 CRef. l:p. 6]. The validity of their
claim notwithstanding, it was intended to draw attention
to the fact that Government managers had not been given
any incentives to prefer contracting over in-house
production despite the existence of A-76. The commercial
activities policy had been in force for ten years when
recognition to the growing number of in-house Government
commercial and industrial activities drew increased
at tent i on
.
1 . A-76 and the Concept of Efficiency
The Government generally is not considered as
efficient as the private sector. This notion stems from
the perception that bureaucracy creates barriers to
efficiency, and was reported as such by the Packard Blue
Ribbon Commission in its final report on Defense
Management to the President in 1986. Circular A-76 was
designed and has evolved to produce a set of review
procedures to assure a greater degree of economic
efficiency in the performance of commercial activities.
£ . Concepts of the CA Program
What exactly does the term "commercial activity"
mean? Commercial Activities are functions either
contracted or operated by a field activity or
headquarters that provide products or services obtainable
from a commercial source CRef. 2:pp. 1-ED. As a result
of less than acceptable reliance on the private sector
during the early years of A-76 , intervention from 0MB
resulted. Since 1976, that intervention was aimed at
placing more emphasis on the goal of the CA program,
which is that the Government should rely upon competitive
procurement for the goods and services it consumes
whenever and wherever practical.
The policy of creating a competitive market for
Commercial Activities is stated in the most recent
version of 0MB circular A-7(S published in August 19S3:
The Government should not compete with its
citizens and the competitive enterprise system
should be fostered by the Government. Purchasing
goods and services from the commercial marketplace
instead of manufacturing those goods and services
with tax revenues is essential to the enhancement of
competition, and the furtherance of quality, economy,
and productivity- CRef. 33
3. Why Contract-Out?
The way to execute the policy is not simple. If
the Government is to provide a given level of output it
can produce that output by long term contracts for labor
and capital (explicit or implicit) or it can use a series
of short term contracts (CA). Essentially this is a
make-or-buy decision. Many variables must be considered
in the effort to create competitive markets, and many
decisions based on value judgments must be made.
Creating contracts in either situation will impose
3
differential transactions costs. The policy is designed
to minimize those costs and foster economic efficiency.
There is considerable debate regarding the best course of
action to take regarding Government's use of commercial
contracts to become more efficient. For this and other
reasons as shall be discussed, the A-76 policy has been
the subject of much rhetoric, especially in light of the
recent report tendered by President's Commission on
Privatization, headed by David F. Linowes. Mr. Linowes
contends the Government should divorce itself from a
broad range of traditional responsibilities via
privatization and contrac t i ng-out CRef. ^1
.
In the CA program, businesses compete with the
Government for the award of service contracts, and s.re
awarded the contracts when their price is demonstrably
lower than if the Government performed the service for
itself. The A-76 directive has resulted in the study of
18,^36 civilian positions and 3,A-96 military positions in
the Navy through the end of FY 1987, resulting in a net
program payback of *^95.S million CRef. 53.
Recent attention has focused on the contractual
issues collateral to the CA policy issues because the
contracting process itself has become a morass of
regulations and policies designed to afford recognition
for nearly every contingency. The Packard Commission
identified 39^^ regulatory requirements in the Federal
Acquisition Regulation tied to 62 different dollar
thresholds. They stated: "At operating levels within
DoD, it is now virtually impossible to assimilate new
regulatory refinements promptly or efficiently." CRef.
6:p. 553.
The regulatory environment has contributed to
some dysfunction in the CA program as will be shown.
Recognizing the validity of the Packard Commission's
observations, terms like "streamlining" have been seen
more frequently in acquisition programs and
correspondence.
^ . Regulatory Reform and the CA Program
Attention has focused on the necessity to
streaml'ine the CA contracting process and make the smart
thing to do, the "easy" thing to do. Procurement
regulatory reform has been a major initiative of the
Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition) in 1986 and 1987
[Ref. 73. For the commercial activities program, this
translates to the conduct of cost-comparison studies and
the award of contracts based on prudent business
practices and streamlined decision loops which afford the
best use of tax dollars.
Efforts have been directed toward the
establishment of practices and policies which focus on
transactions: quality of performance (better value) at
reasonable cost, not merely "least-cost". CRef. 8:pp. 9-
12] These efforts will be addressed in Chapter III.
Other factors aimed at reducing differential
transactions costs include the types of contracts
written, standardization of procedures, the introduction
of "closer to the trenches" decision making and reduction
of onerous paperwork requirements are contributing to
stream- 1 i ni ng in the CA Program CRef. 8:pp. 12-lA-].
5
. Main Focus of the Thesis
This thesis focuses on performance issues in the
CA program, from both a conceptual and user /observer
perspective. Fixed price award fee contracts are
evaluated as a contracting alternative which may
alleviate some of the persistent performance problems.
B. OBJECTIVE OF RESEARCH
The objective of this research effort is to determine
the benefits and detriments associated with the use of
Fixed Price Award Fee contracts in the Commercial
Activities Program, and to recommend a course of action
with respect to the use of FPAF contracts (specifically
in the services area) which would benefit the Navy.
The Fixed Price Award Fee (FPAF) instrument is
presently being used experimentally as a means to explore
the benefits of alternative contract types for base
support services. The potential benefits are:
1. Enhance the quality of contractor performance.
2. Focus more on end-results and less on "second
guessing" in contract specifications.^
3. Decouple the source selection process for base
service support contracts from the "buy-in"
methodology common to the sealed-bid, fixed price
contract source selection process.^
Potential draw-backs are:
1. FPAF contracts require more administration.
2. FPAF contracts may cost more than firm fixed price.
3. It may be difficult to measure the superiority of
FPAF contracts over alternative contract types
without established standard criteria.
*
"second guessing" refers to the writing of
specifications which are over-detailed, trying to
consider every aspect of potential performance inadequacy.
^^he term "buy-in" is used in reference to a bid for
services which the prospective contractor knows is too
low, but is willing to submit in order to be awarded the
contract and then use contract clauses and language to





Can it be demonstrated that the potential for
benefits in the use of Fixed Price Award Fee service
contracts indicates a need for policy modification? When
Are FPAF contracts preferable to firm fixed price (FFP)
contrac ts?
2 Subsidiary Questions
a. What are some alternative means of
structuring the award fee component of Fixed Price Award
Fee (FPAF) Contracts?
b. What are the primary differences between the
hybrid FPAF and FFP contracts?
c. What is the Navy buying with an award fee
contract and can the Navy justify the cost and the use of
FPAF in head-to-head cost comparisons with Government
versus Contractor bids?
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The thesis will focus on the use of award fee
incentive arrangements as a potential method of choice in
awarding base services contracts. Discussions with the
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-^^3) resulted
in a recommendation that the search for information in
this effort be directed toward activities with similar
8
missions, for example, activities charged with facilities
management. That way, the inquiry would make easier,
clearer comparison of the data because it would be
corroborated by similar administrative agendas.
Interviews with contractors and contract administrators
could be done using the same organizational vocabulary
and frame of reference.
E. METHODOLOGY
Preliminary research included a complete review of
the history of the CA program and its implementing
directives, and a search of literature including GAO
reports, congressional testimony, research papers,
articles, pamphlets and correspondence. Interviews were
conducted with Navy Depar tment- 1 evel managers in
Washington, DC, policy administrators at Navy
contracting field activities, ac t i v i ty- 1 eve 1 contract
administrators and contractor personnel.
The aspects of the hybrid FPAF contract were
discussed and the details concerning the structure and
use of award fees for incent i v i z i ng performance were
examined from a procedural and end-user view point. East
and West Coast Naval Facilities Engineering Command
(NAVFAC) activities using FPAF contracts were asked for
information, and that information is basic to this
9
thesis. Primary observations collected from the field




The following definitions and terms are applicable to
concepts discussed in the thesis.
1 . Commercial Activities (Cft)
A severable"' Government activity identified as
one which can be performed by contract or by the
Government without impediment to defense mobilization
capabilities or other Military essential functions.
Commercial Activities are on-going regularly performed
functions integral to the mission of the Department of
Defense (DoD) which provide a service or product
obtainable from a commercial source CRef. 2:pp. 1-2].
2 . Cost Comparison
A process for determining the economies of
procuring services or products from a commercial or
Government source using specific procedures. The cost
comparison is the basic frame of reference in deciding
whether or not to contract-out. CRef. S:pp. 1-2]
^Severable referring to an activity which can be
segregated from other activities for the purpose of
performing it by contract.
10
3
. Convers i on
The transition from Government performance at a
CA to contractor performance (private sector). Terms
associated are usually "in-house" for Government





A function which is so intimately related to the
public interest as to mandate performance by Government
employees CRef. 2:pp. 1-3D. Uithin DoD, Government
functions will include any activity which embodies
essential defense activity such as mobilization, combat
forces, operational units, and activities vested with the
safeguard of national security.
5. Review
• The examination of a function to determine
whether the present method of performance should be
continued, or whether the function should be scheduled
for a cost comparison for possible change in the method
of performance. CRef. 2:pp. 1-^]
6
.
Full Time Equivalents (FTEs)
A normal work-year is 2080 hours of effort. For
each 2088 hours of effort required to perform a task,
there is said to be one FTE . It is the Government
standard for one man-year of work.
G. THESIS ORGANIZATION
In this thesis, the reader will be introduced to the
history of the CA program, how Government has acquired
defense related goods and services, and development of
the CA program by 0MB. The thesis begins with an outline
and chronology of the CA program in Chapter I.
Chapter II contains an explanation of the mechanics
and the iterative processes associated with cost
comparisons in the CA program, then outlines seven
specific performance problems which were prevalent in the
course of the research.
Chapter III outlines the mechanics of the Award Fee
contract, explains the processes Navy activities must
follow to use Award Fee contracts in commercial
activities, and presents some economic criteria for
selecting between contract alternatives.
Chapter IV presents a review of primary information
sources and synopsis of primary observations. This is
accomplished by summarizing four FPAF contract case
studies from four different locations. Each case was
selected from a limited population of FPAF contracts
within Naval Facilities Engineering Command. Each case
12
has one or two unique characteristics which contribute to
perspective vis-^-vis the research questions.
Chapter V presents independent analysis. Attempting
to draw focus and closure to the relevant issues
surrounding the use of Award Fees with Fixed Price
contracts, the chapter will expand on observations made
in the body of the text, and make recommendations for the
improvement of A-76.
I I . COMMERCIftL ACTIVITIES PROGRAM BACKGROUND
A. CHRONOLOGY
Concern over the Government engaging in competition
with private enterprise is not a new issue. Policy
makers have recognized the potential for excessive
Government interference in private markets since the
post-depression era. The first detailed inquiry into
this matter was made in 1932 by a special committee of
the House of Representatives. Later studies of various
aspects were made by the Appropriations committees in
both Senate and House. In 1955, the second Hoover
Commission presented E2 recommendations aimed at reducing
Government absorption of private markets. That same year
the Senate committee on Government Operations introduced
a bill to write those recommendations into law. Action
was postponed because the Budget Director testified that
the executive branch had a program underway to accomplish
the needed changes administratively. January 15, 1955
the Bureau of the Budget issued bulletin 55-'^ which
essentially started the Commercial Activities Program.
Bulletin 55-'4 was superceded in 1966 by 0MB Circular A-
76, which rests on three precepts:
1. Retain essential Government functions in-house.
P. Rely on the Commercial Sector to the maximum extent
practical. This includes the identification of
Commercial Activities, reporting of CA
inventories, and monitoring of contract costs to
determine the extent to which reliance on the
private sector is warranted.
3. Achievement of economy and productivity through
Government- Industry competition. Costs comparison
shall determine who will do the work.
Circular A-76 further set forth guidelines for
circumstances when in-house performance for a commercial
activity was justifiable without cost-comparison:
1. Procurement of a product or service from commercial
source would disrupt or materially delay an
agency's program,
2. A commercial activity is operated in support of
combat readiness, mobilization readiness, or for
mdividual and unit retraining of military
personne 1
.
3. A satisfactory commercial source is not available
and cannot be developed in time to provide a
product or service when it is needed.
^. The product or service is available from another
Federal agency.
5. Procurement of the product or service from a
commercial source will result in higher cost to the
Government. CRef. 3]
The concept of increased efficiency, lower costs,
and increased private sector involvement in commercial
activities has received wide-spread support in the
15
executive and legislative branches. Unfortunately, the
creation of the program resulted in the perception that
"contrac t i ng-out " was being mandated. Government
agencies were resistant to the notion of contrac t ing-out
for services. The program did not provide managers
incentives for embracing a transition to increased
efficiency through contracts for commercial activities.
The program came under increasing criticism because
it seemed as if a burgeoning bureaucracy was growing in
the effort to implement and administer the program.
Different Government agencies and activities formulated
different ways of handling A-76 and still more scrutiny
was applied because nearly all of the agencies which had
been directed to comply with A-76 were experiencing
difficulty with their versions of the implementing
directives. Federal purchases of private goods and
services declined from 30*/. of federal outlays in 1965 to
18*/. in 1976. Although the dollar value of these
purchases had more than doubled from $66.9 billion to
$130 billion respectively CRef. l:pp. ^^ 15], the
Federal Budget had tripled from $126.5 billion to $380.8
billion. It was this trend in "intramural" activity
which triggered lobbying efforts by the aerospace
industry to assert their contention that there had been a
16
lack of effective implementation of A-76 [Ref. l:p. IS-
13] .
As a result of these events, a full review of the
program began in 1977. In 1979 the revised edition of A-
7(S defined the steps which an executive agency should
take in order to decide whether or not to contract-out a
function. The basic tenet that contrac t i ng-out was the
option of choice unless there were extenuating
circumstances did not change.
During the first years of the Reagan administration
Budget Director David Stockman initiated a review of the
A-76 program. In 198^, CA program savings were targeted
at $1 billion annually by 1988 CRef. 9]. There was a
crusade to revise the cost-comparison methods and
streamline them."- Again revisions were made to the
basic
.
directive aimed at clarifying issues and
simplifying the process while affording recognition to
equity. On 19 November 1987, President Reagan signed
Executive Order 12615 placing new emphasis on the goals
of the CA program. Those goals will be discussed later.
'^The plural term "programs^ requires emphasis. Today
there are many different agency approaches to the
implementing A-76 directive. Although it is not an issue
of this thesis, the issue of standardization for A-76
programs Government-wide is an important area with
considerable potential for further study.
17
Summarily, the A-76 program is complex and under
frequent change and scrutiny. As a result, contractors
formed a lobby to promulgate their interests in
Washington, DC."-' The CA program requires the employment
of special offices charged with oversight and
administration at Departmental (Navy) level, special
assist teams to interpret rules and regulations, and
ac t i v i ty- leve 1 program administrators whose only duty is
to gather statistics and perform CA studies. It is an
expensive program.
The myriad of policy issues which stemmed from the
program over its 32 year history range from retraining of
displaced employees to the use of automated decision
support systems. '^^ From 1 October 1980 through 31
December 1982, GAO issued 10 reports concerned
specifically with A-76. Eight of the reports resulted
from congressional request and two were initiated by GAO.
Since 1982, many more published and unpublished GAO
reports have been issued. Allegations of impropriety
have been made, and the program continues to spawn
controversy
.
"^The lobby is called the National Association of
Government Service Contractors.
^'expert systems designed to computerize portions of
the contract-out decision process
B. A-"6 PROGRAM FRAMEWORK
In order to understand the issues of this thesis
insofar as the use of FRAP contracts for CAs , it is
necessary to present a description of CA program
milestones and subordinate processes within the Navy and
address procurement issues arising from those milestones.
The first step is a look at the current program
implementation. This includes:
1. Determining which functions are CAs
2. Inventorying of CA functions
3. Conduct of CA studies
a. Preparation of Performance Work Statements ( PWS
)
b. Determination of Most Efficient Organization
(MEO)
c. Pricing and Competition
^ . Contr ac t i ng
a. risk apportionment
b. contract administration
1 . . Determininq Which Functions Are CAs
There is a thirteen step process which is used to
arrive at a decision whether or not to contract-out a
function. It begins with decision as to whether the
function is Governmental or commercial. Criteria defined
in the implementing directives CRef. 2] are used to
determine whether a function meets the definition of a





The accumulation of the CA inventory at
installation and Navy level enables management to keep
track of which activities have been studied, which
remained in-house, and which ones were contracted-out. A
review of each function in the inventory is conducted
every five years to re-evaluate whether the function is
being performed in a cost-effective and operationally
effective manner.
3 Conduct of CA Studies
Functions which Bre staffed by fewer than ten
FTEs are not subject to study at the discretion of the
local Commanding Officer. Those functions with more than
ten FTEs are reviewed systematically. The review is
conducted every five years, whether or not the function
is under contract or in-house.
a. Preparation of Performance Work Statements
The first part of the study is the task of
describing the work performed by a function in
contractual terms. This description is called the
Statement of Work, and is the document used to solicit
bids from contractors and the Government for the price of
performance. The PWS defines all of the specifications
and standards for performance, and also defines levels of
20
quality required in performance. Once the PUIS has been
planned and written, the Government must decide how best
to implement staffing for the PWS in order to enter a
competitive bid for the function. This process is called
Most Efficient Organization.
b. Most Efficient Organization
In order to "bid" its costs in a head-to-head
competition, the Government performs several tasks.
First, personnel costs, equipment costs, support costs,
logistics costs, and a myriad of details are appraised to
assemble a Government cos t-of-operat i on . A-76 has a
published supplement called the Cost Comparison Handbook
which contains criteria for assembling and calculating
these costs. The Government must then determine the most
efficient alternative in organization and grade structure
to accomplish the tasks set forth in the PUS. When the
process is complete, the Commanding Officer approves the
MEO and it forms the basis for the Government "bid" in
cost-compar ison.
Uhen the commander decides which
organizational structure is best, s/he must align the
organization that way if the Government wins the bid
competition and retains performance of the function. The
Most Efficient Organization becomes a part of the
21
Government "contract" and cannot be changed without
formal review.
c. Pricing and Competition
Once the PWS has been written and the MEO has
been selected, the Government bid is computed and becomes
proprietary information, not disclosed to unauthorized
persons. Based on the contents of the PWS, contractors
bid the price of their services, and if the contractor
bid is less than the Government bid by more than ten
percent, the contractor wins and the function converts to
contract performance. The ten percent difference is
called the conversion differential . It is an arbitrary
percentage established by GMB to account for the
intangible costs which may arise during the conversion
process. It should be noted that this competition may
take place when a function is placed in the CA inventory
initially or during a subseguent review of the function.
There Br& three options for selecting a
source for the contracted work. The process itself is
entitled Source Selection.
1 . Sealed Bid. A preferred method for CAs
until recently, the Sealed Bid is a selection based on
price alone. The bids from the Government and contractors
a.re publicly opened on a specific date, and the low
S2
bidder who is "responsive and responsible" according to
guidelines in the FAR is awarded the contract.
2. Two Step. This is a "negotiated
procurement" process using a Request for Technical
Proposal where contractors submit unpriced technical
proposals to the Government prior to bid opening. The
Proposals give the contracting officer an opportunity to
review the technical, managerial, and financial
capabilities of the prospective competitors in order to
determine whether they are able to perform the contract
as spec i f i ed
.
3. Source Selection. The Source Selection
is a more sophisticated process wherein requirements,
facts, recommendations and Government policy relevant to
an award decision in a competitive procurement are
examined and the decision on which party gets award is
made. DoD Directive '^105.62 emphasizes that the
objectives of Source Selection are to:
1. Select the source whose proposal has the highest
degree of realism and credibility.
E. Assure impartial, equitable, and comprehensive
evaluation of competitors' proposals.
3. Maximize efficiency and minimize complexity of the
solicitation, the evaluation, and the selection
dec i s ion
.
The three methods of source selection discussed here may
have an impact on the likelihood of success in CA
contract performance, as will be discussed in the next
sect ion
.
^ . Contract inq
When a CA is evaluated for contracted
performance, consideration must be given to several
decision variables. FAR 16.10"^ offers a list of ten such
variables used to approach the contracting decision.
Sherman expands further on those factors in his
discussion on contract-type selection CRef. 12:p. 3363.
In CA contracting, the objective of the Government is to
provide the Contractor with a degree of cost
responsibility and incentive which is consistent with the
risks to be taken during performance. The vehicles for
accomplishing this objective are the varying types of
contracts. Accordingly, one of the chief
responsibilities of the contracting officer is to select
the type of compensation arrangement best suited to the
purpose of the contract. For example, an important
factor is the effort required to administer the contract.
Contract administration begins to resemble production
management for some of the larger and more sophisticated
contracts. It can be labor intensive and can be costly.
Equally important, the nature of the activity being
contracted-out will require that decisions be made as to






Risk apportionment is one function served by
contracts, and the decision to contract-out in the first
place means that the Government must ensure that the
function is performed according to the terms and
specifications of the contract. In this context, the
term risk alludes to such things as cost escalation,
contractors' experience and abilities, and the extent of
control than can and should be maintained over the
contractor's operations. Risk must be carefully
evaluated, and contingencies must be considered in
greater- detail with contracted performance. Insofar as
cost risk is concerned, the DoD position is that when a
reasonable basis for firm pricing exists, the firm fixed
price contract should be used because its use under these
circumstances will provide the contractor with a maximum
profit motive to control the cost of performance. As
will be shown, this method of risk apportionment is
pivotal in the CA contracting process inasmuch as
services are more difficult to write contracts for, and
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hence the risk apportionment issue becomes more
stochast i c
.
b . Contract Administration
Subsequent to contract award, contract
administration begins. Where many contracts require
routine and uneventful administration, the delivery and
acceptance of the ordered items on time, services
contracts require considerable effort which may include
such things as:
1. clarifications of requirements
2. follow-up notifications
3. negotiating changes
^. performing inspections and verifications
5. working to overcome deficiencies, delays, claims,
and problems arising from performance
6. verification of documents associated with payments
and authorization of payment.
In contracting for services, terms and
conditions a.rB not the same as design specifications in
hardware contracts. In services contracts, requirements
specifications sre spelled-out in the statement of work.
In lOOV. of the services contracts examined in this
research, both contractor and contracting office
personnel made reference to problems or inadequacies with
the PUIS. These problems tend to expand all of the tasks
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listed above in a CA services contract, and exacerbate
strained relationships between contractors and the
Government
.
The use of alternative contract types to
minimize problems resulting from the statement of work is
one main focus of this paper, and will be discussed in
Chapter IV.
C. PERFORMANCE ISSUES IN CA PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION
Seven performance issues which arise from data
collected in this study appear to capture much of the
complexities and controversy in the current A-76 program.
They are:
1. value judgments and subjectivity in the CA program
2. structural biases in the program are difficult to
overcome
3. difficulty in writing a "tight" PWS
4. placing quality higher on the CA agenda
5. getting an accurate picture of program savings and
costs is impaired because 0MB standards do not
reflect custom or practice in the field
h . sealed bid source selection with firm fixed price
contracts does not offer a viable method of
execution for most CA service contracts, yet:
7. 0MB A-76 standards impose limitations which
basically preclude consideration of alternative
contract types, leaving decision makers less than
needed flexibility in striving for cost-effective
quality performance.
Expanding the discussion of these issues will show partly
their relevance to the usefulness of FPAF contracts:
1 . Value Judgments and Subjectivity in the CA
Program
The CA contracting process has not risen from the
type of risk assessment (joint strategic planning) used
to acquire major weapons systems. It has risen from the
basic premise that efficiency CBr\ be achieved through the
application of the A-76 guidelines for commercial
activities. In this vein, value judgments must be made.
These may include decisions about organizational "MEO"
staffing levels which afford considerations to
exigencies, plans to expand certain activities or
constrain them, end-strength and pay-grade mixes (manage-
to-payroll) which best accomplish a mission,
mobilization, and other decision variables. These
judgments, while aided by the statistics produced in the
cost comparison process, introduce subjectivity into the
CA process. Hence, the continuing involvement of policy
makers with the CA program has been due largely to the
impression that:
1. Cost comparisons appear to take precedence over the
principle of preference for the private sector.
2. Cost comparisons are made under a dual standard
which favors in-house work.
3. DoD organizations will endeavor to find exceptions
which allow a course of action they prefer.
^. The self interest of federal civilian employees
conflicts with the policy, and this places bias in
program implementation. CRef. l:p. 12]
In order for the CA program to achieve a more objective
application, Navy policy makers encourage interaction at
all levels in the chain of command involved in a CA
study. This interaction is seen as a method to make use
of the broadest perspective available in evaluating
subjective decision variables without the removal of
decision-flexibility. For example, the opportunity to
award one FPAF "umbrella" contract for many services
offers a chance to exploit economies of scale, but the
current Navy instruction does not provide specific
guidance on this issue, nor is there any discussion of
alternative contract types and their recommended uses.
Collateral to the issue of subjectivity, administration
and execution of the A-76 directive is handled
differently by the Navy Systems Commands CRef. 7], A
study of these differences was undertaken by the
Assistant Secretary of the Navy ( S&.L) in February 1988 to
further evaluate the possibility of eliminating some of
the subjective decision variables in the CA contracting
process CRef. 7].
2 . Structural Biases in the Program are Difficult to
Overcome
.
Military Commanders at installations tend to want
functions left in-house. Some point out that the
Government has the technical knowledge, related
equipment, and the experienced qualified people. The
Government also has no performance bond requirements to
meet or conversion differential to cover. These
considerations cause a natural reluctance of involved
personnel to pursue a process that may affect their own
job secur i ty
.
Commanders feel that contractor performance
problems may be more awkward to solve as a customer vice
having direct line authority. For example, the Base
Commander receives short notice of an impending visit by
a VIP. S/he activates a plan to ensure the cosmetic
appearance of the base receives immediate attention,
finding that the applicable contract for base support
would require a change or the contractor unable to comply
with the plan without added compensation. This frame of
reference tends to shore-up the notion that loss of a
function to contract is a loss of control and
flexibility. Summarily, this frame of reference causes
some intransigence on the part of Base Commanders, and
biases in favor of in-house performance may result.
Other biases may become manifest as a result of
certain actions performed in the conversion process. For
example, GAD completed a study at Fort Sill Oklahoma
relating to an A-76 cost comparison performed for a
mu 1 t i -func t ion award fee contract. The report, completed
in December 1987, states that "Certain inequities" CRef.
10:p. 1j were found in 0MB rules for cost comparison
which could bias cost comparisons toward contracting.
Those cited were:
1. Award Fee Costs [Ref. 10:Table CI
2. Social Security
lOrTable DD
Thrift Plan Costs [Ref.
3. Outdated Department of Labor Wage Rates CRef.
10:Table El
The study points out that the estimated cost of
contrac t i ng-out for that particular function may be
understated by as much as *2 . 7 million due to the
exclusion from cost comparison of an award fee payable to
the contractor. Through a series of reviews, a decision
was reached in this case to revise the contract removing
the award fee. GAOs conclusion was that:
...the cost comparison was biased in favor of
contractors because costs for equal performance were
omitted. The Army has corrected this inequity by
changing the award fee provision.
Congress could, however, still argue that the 0MB
rules are equitable in favor of contractors because
they don't count award fee costs that are likely to be
incurred. The reasons they are likely to be incurred
are: we use the award fee process as an incentive to
get the quality we want; we expect the contractor to
earn an award; the contractor bases his bid on the
expectation of earning an award; our experience is
contractors typically earn about three quarters of the
award fee available. CRef. lOrTable C]
During the same review, GAO was advised by both OSD and
the Army that other inequities in 0MB rules could bias
cost comparisons. GAO chose not to pursue those issues,
but made mention of them in its report. They are:
1. Government overhead costs are not fully reflected in
cost comparisons.
2. Government costs for save-grade/save pay are not
included in cost comparisons.
3. 107. conversion differential is not based on any
scientific study or method.
^. 0MB rules overstate in-house severance pay and other
one-time costs.
5. Government Quality control costs a.r& not included
in cost comparison, contractors quality control
costs are. CRef. 10:Table F]
A related commentary on the subject of quality control
costs was made by The Center for Naval Analysis in its CA
study in 1987. It said, "0MB QA staffing standards do
not reflect custom or practice in the field." CRef. ll:p.
2D. However, the allegation that quality control costs
are "...not included in cost comparison..." in the Fort
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Sill case is refuted by the wording in the A-76 Cost
Comparison Handbook, where those costs are treated
specifically as follows: "Contract administration costs
are... the cost of reviewing contractor performance and
comp 1 iance with the terms of the contract, processing
payments, and monitoring contract closeout" CRef. 3:p.
IV-363]. The performance issue which arises is that
contract administration costs are greater than 0MB
standards frequently enough to question the 0MB
standards, and that this fact may indicate a structural
bias which should be examined further. Insofar as QA
costs are treated as part of contract administration
costs in 0MB standards, a structural bias may result from
the lack of segregation of these two types of overhead
costs. Further, some program biases may exist by virtue
of the- fact that 0MB CA program standards are not
comprehensive enough for the state-of-the-art DoD
acquisition environment.
3. Difficulty in Uritinq a "Tight" PUIS
Defining the services to be performed in
Statements of Work via requirements specifications has
proven to be a major challenge, and has created its own
set of problems CRef. 12:pp. ^7-^9][Ref. 8:p. 103. The
performance issue is embracing quality performance
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without having to write a PUS which is comprehensive to
the point it becomes cumbersome. The CNO goal is simpler
contracts with more workable contract specifications.
CRef. 13: end. (2):p. 23.
^
. Placing Quality Higher on the CA Agenda
Quality is an amorphous term with several
meanings. For purposes of this thesis, guality in
service contracts implies that the Government is getting
its desired output seguence from the contractor, or
"best value for dollars spent". The issue of guality in
service contracts is three fold:
1. How guality is measured.
2. Relative weighing of guality with other factors.
3. Existing CA directives and guidelines are not
consistent with current DoD contracting philosophy
regarding contractual vehicles to improve guality.
The highest affordable guality cannot be adeguately
defined in reguirements specifications and work
statements
.
In service contracting, the Government may want
to encourage the contractor to exercise considerable
discretion and personal judgment in deciding what output
characteristics a.r& most appropriate in specific
circumstances. In the case of FPAF contracts, the
Government is contracting for "best effort" up to the
fixed price amount, but will pay a bonus for the
contractor to produce the most appropriate output called
3^
for by circumstances. With more than ^7,000 positions
vet to be studied during and after 1988 CRef. 13:encl. 2]
the Government's approach to quality in CAs is pivotal
vis-A-vis the stated goals of operational and cost
effectiveness. Contracts which contain weighting factors
and measuring factors for quality are being advocated by
policy makers CRef. 15]. The existing Navy instruction
-^S^O.TB, however, is silent on the application and use of
criteria and contractual vehicles for better quality
performance. Evidence clearly indicates that quality has
not been high on the agenda in CA service contracting
inasmuch as "least cost" has been afforded primacy in
source selections CRef. 8:p. 1].
a. The "Buy-In" Issue
The term "buy-in" is used to refer to
contractors who bid a CA contract lower than they can
realistically expect the costs of performance to be.
Once awarded the contract on low bid, they look for
deficiencies in the specifications in order to expand the
PWS or modify the contract. This is not difficult to do.
In a service contract, with work defined in scope by the
Performance Work Statement ( PWS ) , differing
interpretations of work specifications evolve out of
opposing perspectives of the buyer and seller. For
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example, in a design specification, weights and measures
can be precise, and less subject to individual discretion
than tasks outlined by a PWS. Unless the customer
activity has done an exceptional job writing the PWS,
there will probably be areas the contractor can interpret
in a way which may cause a change in the contract CRef.
l^:pp. 2-^]. Under certain conditions, contractors find
it relatively easy to exploit the "buy-in" option if it
is part of their business agenda CRef. 8:p. 11].
The avoidance of the "buy-in" is a
consequential collateral issue brought on insofar as the
buy-in introduces the specter of potential problems with
quality, and the potential for costly adversarial
relationships in firm fixed price contracts awarded via
sea 1 ed bid.
One illustrative example is the case of
Technicolor Government Services versus the United
States.'' The case file (on-going) has 253 tabs and
approximately 10,000 pages of text and correspondence
related to quality performance. The claim resulting from
the differing view points on contract performance started
at approximately $77,000 and now exceeds that amount as
^ N00189-8<^-C-021 1 , Armed Services Board of
Contract Appeals (ASBCA) #s 31581, 32302, 323^^, and
32397: Technicolor Government Services Inc. vs. the U.S.
attorney fees and other related costs to the claimant
accumulate. The administrative burden imposed on both
parties is costly.
While quality performance has become a
priority of program administrators, an ancillary problem
on the method of source selection employed in services
contracting still exists. Better quality performance may
allegedly be obtained with two-step source selection.
Two-step is also advocated as an acquisition alternative
to abate the buy-in issue CRefs. 8,1^,15]. Full fledged
source selection has also been discussed as a viable
route to ensure that the competitive range of contractors
have submitted realistic offers. CRef. 15]
5 . Obtaining an Accurate Picture of Program Savings
and Costs
The total cost of creating a market via the A-76
initiative has been higher than originally projected.
Annual Navy program savings for the year 1987 are
approximately 207. of the $B i 1 1 i on/year savings goal for
DoD set in 1984. In a study released in April 1985, GAD
did a detailed review of 20 functions contracted-out
under A-76 CRef. 161. In 1007, of the cases reviewed
there was a reduction in projected savings. In 797. of
the cases reviewed there was a significant change in
required work, resulting in contract cost increases.
These were identified as increases mandated mainly by
wage rates determined by the Department of Labor under
the Services Contract Act.
The original estimated savings for the SO
functions was $1^.5 million. Cost increases amounted to
$11.8 million, 81*/. of original estimated savings. Net
savings after contract changes was $2.7 million. Had the
functions remained in-house, cost increases of equal
magnitude are assumed by the GAO study to have occurred.
However, the researcher could not determine the basis for
this assumption.
Additionally, if contract administration costs
had been more than ^'Z, of contract price (as alleged by
several sources) [Ref. 3:p. 363CRef. ll:p. 23,
administrative costs for the 20 contracts would be
understated. This ostensibly would contribute to a
further reduction in the Government's return on
investment (ROI) in those 20 contracts.
a. CA Program Costs Framed Around ROI as a
Performance Measure
Return on investment (ROI) is Ar\ accounting
term which, to most people, tells them whether they s.tg
receiving their money's worth for something they bought.
38
More correctly, ROI is a popular approach to
incorporating invested capital into a performance
measure. ROI as a statistic can be used to compare
alternative opportunities. ROI is increased by any
action that decreases costs, increases revenues, or
decreases invested capital. In the case of the CA
program, ROI would be a function of total invested tax
dollars divided by total program savings. The difficulty
in computing actual ROI for CA would lie in capturing all
costs and savings accurately. For example, in the 1985
GAO study mentioned above, the investment in conducting
the studies was not identified. The number of affected
employees was 2,535. 112 personnel required relocation;
129 were involuntarily separated and paid severance pay;
298 retired and 171 were employed by the contractors.
The costs associated with these personnel
actions were not directly allocated to Government cost
estimates for the contract conversions discussed in the
study. The Naval Audit Service made the observation in
December 1986 that the Government "...needs better cost
yardsticks for evaluating CAs after a decision has been
made. The existing financial systems do not capture
costs by CA function." CRef. 17:p. 7]
b . QA and Other Transactions Costs
Post award transactions costs may include QA
»
changes in scope, loss of mission capability in disputes
or terminations, or any costs associated with deviant
contract performance. These "intangible" costs are part
of the ten percent contract conversion differential.
The Center for Naval Analysis conducted a
detailed study at the Submarine Base, Bangor, Washington
to collect QA and related cost data on the Base Operating
Support contract. The study used regression analysis
techniques on 25 services contracts at Great Lakes Public
Works Center, and used historical data from NAS, Memphis
in order to compare CA contract experience with 0MB
guidelines. The agency formulated a cost estimating
relationship to forecast QA staffing requirements based
on their findings. The summary of findings suggests that
ONB staffing standards, which were breached in most of
the cases the Center observed, do not reflect custom or
practice in the field. The contracts observed were
mostly mature and "...may actually reflect a lower level
of staffing [for QA] than new CA contracts might
initially need" CRef. ll:p. ED. The findings suggest
that the costs of CA contract administration and QA Bre
consistently higher than 0MB guidelines. The study
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recommended the use of 6-7'/. of contractor full time
equivalents (FTEs) as a reasonable estimate of QA
staffing requirements (not including other contract
administration personnel costs). This is one example
where cost realism vis-.^-vis transactions costs is a
shortcoming of 0MB commercial activities guidelines.
According to the CNO (OP -^^3) at the end of
FY 1987, total Navy CA program cost was $125.3 million
captured from FY 1979 forward. Contract conversion
savings from FY 1979 to 1987 total $305.2 million, and
MEO savings for in-house and contract performance are
$315.3 million. Assuming all of the input data is
correct, as of FY 1987, net Navy program payback is
$^95.2 million for nine years of program performance
[Ref. 8]. If unamortized or partially amortized
transaction costs, such as those mentioned here, were
fully included in CA program analysis, the savings
publicized would be smaller.
The fact that CA program savings are achieved
is not questioned by this paper. The performance issue
is that the exact amount is difficult, if not impossible
to quantify, and allegedly smaller than program
proponents suggest. The performance challenge which
arises is for the Government to use measures of input and
output which espouse cost realism in the CA program to
afford a better picture of program costs and benefits.
c . The Future Perspective on Program Savings
The FY 1988 Defense Appropriation Bill
contains language which makes future program savings more
uncertain. It places the review determination decision
for functions not yet studied in the hands of Unit
Commanders. It is too early to assess the effect of this
new policy in terms of dollar savings or outlays, because
the promulgation of Executive Order 12615, PERFORMANCE OF
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES dated 19 November 1987 establishes
new requirements for the study of -^7000 additional FTEs
.
It is oriented toward CA program growth and basically in
diametrical opposition to the language of the
appropriations bill.
6
. Sealed Bid Fixed Price Source Selection for
Contracts Does Not Fit the CA Decision Model
The CA contracting process does not lend itself
well to the application of sealed-bid source selection or
the use of firm fixed price arrangements. There s.re four
criteria which are the basis for determining the
propriety of a sealed-bid firm fixed price arrangement:
1. Contract specifications are relatively concrete and
s imp 1 e
.
2. "Meaningful discussions" with offerors should not be
necessary
.
3. The buyer can expect more than one bidder.
^. Award can be made on price alone. CRef. 18:pp.
2^0,336]
In contracting for an array of base operating services in
one contract, these criteria are not all met. The PWS
requirements in a large CA contract may be detailed and
complex. Although some activities are predictable and
straightforward (i.e., simple to specify in a contract),
others are not, and those which do not meet those
criteria may be better suited for negotiated procurement.
"Meaningful discussions" held during negotiated contract
competitions offer an opportunity for alleviating
problems prior to final bidding and contract award.
Issues which might change a contractor's bid are
sometimes discovered, and without the opportunity to hold
these discussions, the Government and the Contractor are
exposed to greater risk of contract performance problems
1 ater on
.
Contracts awarded on the basis of price alone are
the instrument of choice for buying off-the-shelf
hardware, where quality is inexpensive to define, and
easy to achieve and measure. On the other hand, the cost
of CA service contracts awarded on the basis of price
^3
alone have been shown to rise because of inadequacy of
the PUS, changes in scope, exigencies, and other reasons
[Ref. 16:p. 3]. In its final report called Smarter
Contracting for Installation Support Services , the
Logistics Management Institute recommended that:
...the Assistant Secretary of Defense ( A&L) instruct
the Military Services to increase use of two
alternative contract types and remove the self-
imposed restrictions inhibiting their use. CRef.
l-^rp. ii]
In practice, the measures of quality and compliance
desired by the Government in CA contracts may not be
easily incorporated into firm fixed price arrangements,
or acquired with assurance via sealed-bid source
se lee t i on
.
7. 0MB Standards Basically Preclude Consideration of
Alternative Contract Types
The Military Services have created some self-
imposed inhibitions with respect to contracting for CAs
.
These have come about because the Government bid in an A-
76i competition is based on one level of performance and
the bid for that level is computed using 0MB standards
regarding allocable and allowable costs. Circular A-76
stipulates that only the fixed portion of any total price
be included in cost comparisons. The award fee (or any
incentive) is excluded since one party, the Government,
is required to meet only minimum performance standards
and the objective is to compare equal performance.
Consideration of alternative contract types has
been constrained at Navy CAs insofar as bidding for award
fee contracts involves some "gaming" by the parties
involved. Consistent with competitive practices, they
try to forecast how much incentive they could
realistically expect to earn, in turn predicting expected
return on investment. No such option is available to the
Government in A-76 competitions. Therefore, under
current conditions, the flexibility to award other than
firm fixed price contracts in CA competitions is limited.
This lack of flexibility is structured in the cost
comparison process, and there is hesitancy to institute
changes toward more flexibility because of differing
management perspectives at the policy level CRef. 193.
For example, GAD ' s position on cont rac t- type for services
contracts contradicts DoD's position. GAD contends that
DoD's stated position of moving away from defining
requirements in minimally acceptable terms and moving
toward a system of acquiring best quality at a fair and
reasonable price is:
"(1) inappropriate for routine, predictable base
support services (2) questionable in view of the fact
that higher qual i ty .... costs more and (3) inconsistent




In response to GAQ ' s position that firm fixed price
contracts remain the vehicle of choice for base services,
the Assistant Secretary of Defense ( P&cL) asserted DoD's
position in October 1987, stating:
The GAO recommendations Cwith respect to base
operating services contracts] would force the use of
contract types and of contract splitting, which is not
justified on the facts.... the services must retain
flexibility in tailoring Ccontracts] to fit the unique
circumstances of each individual procurement. CRef.
21 ]
Interviews conducted among policy makers in the
Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Navy for
Shipbuilding and Logistics affirm the view that firm
fixed price contracts do not offer a full spectrum of
ways to get the best value for base services. Further,
it seems axiomatic that while working well in some cases,
FFP contracts are not efficient vehicles for the
acquisition of mu 1 t i -func t i on "BOS-type" services. Under
current guidelines, however, the Government is hesitant
to surmount the requirement to compare only fixed price
performance in the A-76 process. The researcher was not
able to identify any instances where CA cost comparisons
in the Navy resulted in the award of FPAF contracts.
D. SUMMARY
The seven performance issues arising from the
research emanate from the interface between contracting
policies and commercial activities policies. For
example, the issue of buying quality for base services
touches both areas:
1. defining what level of quality is to be utilized in
cost comparisons (minimal or more than minimal) is a
matter best addressed by A-76 policy.
2. the vehicle(s) used to buy that level of quality are
defined in contracting policy (FAR, DoD FAR
supplement and associated directives).
While this is by no means the only example of policy
interface around A-76, it serves to focus attention to
the seven issues discussed in terms of the original
question vis-^-vis FPAF contracts. The propriety of FPAF
contracts in the CA program is directly concerned with
the administrative influences of A-76 and those of Navy
contracting directives; both of which may require
modification in order to facilitate the award of FPAF
contracts in the cost-comparison process.
Further, the seven performance problem areas may not
be dealt with exclusively by the use of alternative
contract types, however, the issues form the baseline for
discussion regarding the attributes of FPAF contracts for
base services.
^7
The following chapter centers on the Fixed Price
Award Fee contract. It explores the attributes and
applicability of FPAF for CA-type service contracting.
III. THE FIXED PRICE AUARD FEE CONTRACT
A. COMPONENT PARTS
The Fixed Price Award Fee contract is considered a
hybrid type contract because the contract utilizes two
component parts, a Fixed Price component and an Award Fee
component. These components differ substantially from
the firm fixed price arrangement in that contractor
incentives for performance are present and risk
apportionment is shifted somewhat as shall be described.
B. FPAF CONTRAST TO FIRM FIXED PRICE
In a firm fixed price contract, all cost risk is
borne by the contractor. S/he provides a specific level
of service for a specific period of time for a specific
price. ' The costs to the Government Are fixed. Firm
fixed price bids ^re preferred by GAO and DoD when the
right conditions are present. For cost comparison, the
bottom line can be readily compared with the Government
in-house estimate.
The FFP gives the contractor considerable incentive
to control costs, since this would increase his profit.
However, this incentive tends to be a disadvantage to the
Government because contractors may most readily control
^9
costs by sacrificing quality. Decreases in quality are
easier to detect in contracts for hardware than in
services contracts CRef. l<^:pp. 2-43. Also, deviants
from specified contract performance are difficult to deal
with because they may involve changes to the specified
level of service and hence, changes to the contract. In
the case of FFP contracts, the contractor has a right to
seek consideration for any change in the scope of
performance, and because cost risk and cost control are
entirely his responsibility, s/he is expected to use that
right. Contracting literature generally states that FFP
contracts work well for simple functions which ar& easily
defined and minimally subject to change.
C. PRESERVING FFP ADVANTAGES AND ADDING INCENTIVE
FEATURES
The Fixed Price Award Fee ( FPAF ) contract is one in
which the contractor proposes to perform a specific level
of service for a specified length of time at a price
which includes all costs and fee. The "award fee" is a
bonus for higher than "standard" levels of performance.
If the contractor expends no effort to meet those higher
levels, it incurs no risk and earns no fee. If the
contractor expends effort and resources to achieve a
higher performance level, a part of the Award Fee is
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earned. This incentive approach should not force the
contractor to undertake high risk? but provides
motivation to undertake© ^ofne rieh in wrd^r vh get A
better return on investment. The maximum fee percentage
is specified in the contract, and the amount received by
the contractor is determined unilaterally by the
Government on assessments of performance periodically
over the term of the contract. It has many of the
advantages the FFP has, but is considered superior by
those interviewed for several reasons:
1. It is equivalent to the Government offering a split
profit to the contractor. One part is fixed and
non-negotiable; provided as a residual over the
dollar cost of performance. The contractor still
has incentive to control costs- The other part is
compensation for quality assurance by the seller.
2. The award fee should provide better contract
performance by defining a means of encouraging a
more responsive attitude on the part of the
contractor. The promise of a.r) award fee not only
di-rects the contractor's outlook toward end results,
but may provide a positive psychic advantage which
mitigates part of the adversarial element in the
Government /contractor relationship. The periodic
award fee "report card" lets both sides know whether
the quality and level of service are satisfactory.
Hence, cooperation between Government and contractor
may improve, and quality may become an important
part of the contractor's agenda, because he is
allowed to exercise discretionary authority over the
level of "bonus" he wishes to earn via the award
fee .
In the FPAF arrangement, the use of the award fee is
attractive to the Government because it accomplishes two
th ings
.
1. It acts as an incentive for quality performance.
2. The amount of fee awarded is unilaterally determined
by the Government and is not subject to the disputes
clause. In other words it cannot be protested by a
contractor through normal contractual channels such
as the Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals.
The contractor essentially needs a very compelling
reason to contest the amount of the award fee.
In the FPAF contract, the two components are
symbionic. The fixed price component is designed to
offer the Government predictability, low cost risk, and
decreased levels of planning and budgeting scrutiny. The
award fee component is designed to enhance communication
between the Government and the contractor and stimulate
contractor investment in labor and capital for better
resu Its.
D. MECHANICS OF THE FPAF CONTRACT
The Award Fee is a specific sum of money, portions of
which a contractor may receive for performance that
exceeds the specified levels in the contract. A typical
award fee arrangement involves the earning of points by
the contractor for performance. Distribution of
percentage weights in performance categories depends on
the type service being performed. The following criteria
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were common to a majority of the FPAF contracts examined
for this thes i s :
FACTOR MAX POINTS
Quality of work 30
Response to emergency /urgent calls 20
Timely work completion 15
Prompt and formatted submittals 20
Cooperation and integrity 10
Admin controls and sub-cont . mgt. 5
TOTAL 100
The amount of the Award Fee is fixed and fully funded
at the time of contract award, and the portion to be
disbursed is determined periodically via contract
surveillance. It is based on points assigned (as above)
as percentages of the periodic amount. For example, 80
points might be equivalent to 5'/. of the award fee, 81
points would yield lOV. etc. The amount not awarded in a
given review period may not be carried forward.
The contractor's performance is evaluated daily by
Government employees appointed as Performance Monitors.
They report to a Quality Assurance Evaluator ( QAE ) . The
QAE meets weekly with the contractor to offer feedback on
performance. QAE personnel also recommend a point total
for contractor performance which is evaluated by an
Activity Award Fee Committee, chaired usually by the
Contracting Officer with all interested parties present,
including one contractor representative. The Committee
forwards its recommendation to the Award Fee
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Determination Official (usually a level one contracting
officer at the next level in the chain of command). The
Award Fee Determination Official then approves or
disapproves the fee recommendation, prepares the
paperwork for approval of the fee, and the Contractor is
notified that s/he may invoice the Government for the
amount of the Fee approved. There is also an Award Fee
Determination Board involved in the process, but very
recently, that board was discontinued on the west coast
(Western Division Naval Facilities Engineering Command)
because it was performing a redundant function CRef. 22].
The Award Fee contract requires more post-award
management than FFP contracts. After acquiring approval
for use of FPAF , the requesting activity must develop an
Award Fee Determination Plan, Quality Assurance Plan, and
Quality Assurance Staffing Plan. Selection of the
performance evaluation criteria arB developed in concert
with the customer activity, and from this effort an award
fee plan is developed. ^^ Resources ar& mobilized to
ensure a capable trained staff is employed for quality
surveillance, and the standing committee is appointed to
assess the contractor's performance on a regular basis,




monitor performance, and liaison with a fee determination
official CRef. S3].
In summary, the FPAF contractual process runs through
approximately 13 milestones and generally takes more than
four months to complete. Class deviations from the FAR
granting the use of Award Fee contracts without prior
approval for higher authority a.re not yet in place CRef.
23]. The requesting activity must develop a memorandum
of Determination and Findings ( D8»F ) in accordance with
FAR 16. "^030 which must be forwarded and approved prior to
use of an FPAF contract. This process averages 30 days
within NAVFAC. The added effort involved in award and
administration of FPAF CA contracts vis a vis end results
is viewed favorably by personnel interviewed, with one
exception which will be discussed in Chapter IV.
W. SYNOPSIS OF PRIMARY OBSERVATIONS
AND CASE DATA
A. APPROACH TO DATA PRESENTATION
In order to offer perspective to the different
attributes of FRAP contracts and their suitability for
commercial activities, case data was gathered for four
FRAP contracts. The objective of the case data
presentation is to synopsize real-world problems,
benefits, and collateral issues arising from the use of
FRAP contracts for services. All are under
organizational cognizance of Naval Facilities Engineering
Command. Each case has features which allow evaluation
of different variables present in the award fee contract,
and different perspectives from base-level personnel
involved. Each is presented in the following format:
1. Contract management
2. Contract performance
3. The Award Pee determination plan
a. QA staffing plan
b. QA plan and schedule of deductions
^. Observed results
There may not be clear lines of demarkation with respect
to the specific broad category under which an issue is
presented, as it is likely that one issue or benefit may
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have an impact in several areas, but it is intended that
the primary observations be compar tmented to allow the
reader a clearer frame of reference. Case data may be
augmented by commentary or analysis where appropriate.
B. CASE DATA
1 . Base Operating Services Contract, NA5 Ulhitinq
Field, Flori da
a. Contract Management
Before beginning specific discussion of
contract management, the context and use of the term will
be outlined to form a baseline for this category.
Contract management encompasses all relationships between
the contractor and the Government which grow out of
contract performance. Issues which arise out of contract
management vary from case to case, and include such
things as organization, objectives, contract complexity,
and the level of interaction between customer and
contractor
.
At Whiting Field, the FPAF contract is for
performance of base operating services (hereinafter
r&ferred to as BOS). Source selection was accomplished
via the two-step method. It has a fixed price of $3.5
million per year plus an Award Fee of $300,000 per year
($75,000 per quarter). The FPAF contract did not arise
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from initial Go vernment /Cont rac tor CA competition,
(although all activities under the contract are CAs ) and
it was awarded as a follow-on to a Fixed Price Incentive
Fee contract which ran to term and was not renewed.
The Fee Determining Official (FDD) for this
contract is the Commanding Officer, Southern Division,
Naval Facilities Engineering Command in Charleston, South
Carolina. The local award fee evaluation committee
submits recommendations concerning the amount of
quarterly award fee to Southern division, NAVFAC , where
the Award Fee Board makes final a recommendation the
amount of fee to be approved by the FDD.
b. Contract Performance
The first year of performance was FY 1985
with four option years. The command is satisfied with
the contractor, and renewal options in the basic contract
have been exercised since the base year CRef. E^l . The
primary method of verifying contract performance is
random sampling supported by validated customer
complaints. The random sampling is accomplished by
selecting numbered items from the contractor's work
schedule. For example, a number is selected from a table
of random numbers. The item number on the work schedule
which corresponds to the random number selected will be
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evaluated. Approximately SOV. of all service calls are
checked for compliance with contract requirements. QA
work-sheets are filled out by Quality Assurance
Evaluators (QAEs).
Collaterally, the Naval Audit Service
observed that the Government relies too heavily on
customer complaints to evaluate contractor performance,
and that customers may not be a\/^arB of all PWS
requirements. [Ref. 17:p. 8] In this and other cases,
respondents tended to counter by pointing out that more
comprehensive (and expensive) QA plans and bigger QA
staffs should not be necessary with FPAF contracts than
with FFP insofar as the contractor has discretionary
authority to invest in resources for improved performance
and can expect a return on that investment via award fee.
In other words, customer satisfaction may be a useful
money saving barometer of contractor performance,
especially where evaluation of the award fee is partly in
the hands of the customer command.
At Whiting Field, the level of performance
desired by the command is outlined in a written QA plan
which is keyed to performance-oriented specifications.
Performance is measured by the end results, rather than
by the methods used to generate those results. There sre
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eight functional areas covered by the contract with 1*^0
separate rated performance items.
Using the given criteria, contractor
performance has been evaluated as consistently above
standard. Since contract award, the contractor has
earned an average award fee approximately 95*/. of the AF
pool [Ref. 253.
c. Award Fee Determination Plan
The payment of the award fee in this case is
contingent on compliance levels in each annex of the
contract rated at 80 points or above. The point scheme
and computations are as follows:
E 1 ement Max Points
1. Quality of work 30
2. Contractor response to
emergency, urgent, and
routine service calls EO
3. Timely completion of work 15
^. Required reports Cformat , t imel y ] 5
5. Admin and Cost Control of 20
subcontracted work.
6. Cooperation and Ingenuity 1_0
Total 100
A total performance score below 80 results in no
percentage of the fee awarded for a particular review
period. The score in each category is tabulated 0-100,
then that score is multiplied by the weights (percentage
points) and the sum of those products results in the
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weighted total performance score. The schedule for the
award fee reads as follows:
Percentage of
Numerical Points Earned Award Fee
















95 and above 1007.
A specific QA staffing plan is not included
in the contract. Rather, estimated man-hours of QA
effort are listed in section B of the QA Guide and in
each annex of the QA plan. The contract is relatively
mature, however one contract administrator feels that
there are inadequate personnel resources to properly
staff the administrative and QA requirements set forth in
the Award Fee arrangement. CRef. 26] Records regarding
the differences in QA effort between the former FPIF
contract and the Award Fee contract are not available in
sufficient detail for comparison of OA costs under the
different circumstances.
d. Observed Results
It is felt that the award fee arrangement at
Whiting Field is superior to the fixed price incentive
fee arrangement used in the former BOS contract because
he Government is receiving superior performance and has a
positive relationship with the contractor. Further, that
a by-product of the award fee is enhanced communication
between Government and the contractor CRef. 2^].
The contractor's Project Manager at Whiting
Field feels that the award fee arrangement is superior to
firm fixed price contracts for the Government. He
acknowledges that earning 95-100'/. of the award fee is the
norm for his company and that investing in additional
labor and capital is an option pursued regularly and
aggressively to ensure the performance needed to earn
maximum award fee. He further states that the contractor
bid the award fee as profit, using a zero-base fixed
price. He also and shares S5*/. of the award fee with his
employees. The sharing plan is regarded as a vehicle to
achieve less supervision and more quality performance
CRef. 27]. It should be noted that In addition to the
BGS contract at Whiting Field, the contractor has CA type
6E
services contracts at Cecil Field, Florida; Whidbey
Island, Washington; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
California; and Sub Base Bangor, Washington.
The following summarizes the observations
concerning the FRAP contract made by the Facilities
Support Contract Office ( FSCO ) and by the contractor:
F5C0 Observations
1. Inconsistencies in statement of work.
2. Inability of contractor to do Davis-Bacon type work
over $E,000 with in-house forces. **
3. Lack of a detailed schedule of deductions.
4. Lack of resources for additional QAE and
administrative effort related to award fee
contract
.
5. Inadequate inventory of equipment included in
contrac t
.
6. Lack of clear definition on what office would be
responsible for production management of the
(Tont rac t .
Contraztor Observ^ations
1. Government should spend more time on contract
preparat i on
.
2. $2000 limit on Davis Bacon indefinite quantity work
is difficult to comply with and still get the job
done .
'^Davis Bacon work is named after the Davis Bacon
Act. It is construction and "trades-type" work valued at
over $2000.
3. There are no Navy-wide standards for BOS contracts
with respect to the drafting of specifications.
Different commands write different specifications
for the same type work.
^. Navy public works centers do not do business the
same. It hinders the contractor's ability to be
respons i ve
.
5. The award fee takes too long to process from review
through approval and payment to the contractor.
2 . Custodial Services Contract, Naval Aviation
Depot, Alameda, California
a. Contract Management
This FPAF contract is currently in the
solicitation phase. While contractor observations are
not available, the circumstances which led to selection
of FPAF for performance of the function illustrate the
application of a FPAF contract.
b. Historical Perspective
The contract is being solicited to replace a
firm fixed price contract with s.r\ 8A firm (Small
Business). The problem requiring most management
attention has been customer complaints of non-
performance or sub-standard performance CRef. 28]. The
present 8A contract (awarded to a small disadvantaged
businesses on a sole-source basis) was preceded by a
contract which ended via termination for default for
6^
similar reasons. It is felt that the award fee
arrangement will lead to better Go vernment /contrac tor
relations and improved performance CRef. 28]. Contract
administration for the Aviation Depot is accomplished by
the Public Works Center located at the Army Depot,
Oakland, California. The base contract period is for 12
months commencing September 1988 with four option years.
If any of the options for extension is exercised by the
Navy, a new Award Fee Plan must be approved by Western
Division, NAVFAC . Each award fee period is three months.
The existing contract is priced at approximately $1.1
million. The estimated cost of the new contract is *1
million per year, and the award fee pool is $70,000 per
year. It is the first FPAF contract handled by PWC San
Francisco. The Contract Management Officer, LT R.W.
Henderson, contends there will be a marked improvement in
quality and service from the use of the FPAF contract.
He points out that three full-time QAEs were required to
monitor to the FFP contract because there were so many
complaints. He could not adequately document them with
the recommended staffing of two QAEs. If 2 QAEs can
perform surveillance adequately, as indicated by the QA
Staffing Plan for the FPAF contract, the command
allegedly can save the cost of one man-year of effort
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with the new contract. Summarily, the command expects to
get better performance, save one man-year of QA costs,
and spend approximately the same amount of money for the




No evidence is available on contract
performance for this FPAF contract, however, the FPAF
contract solicitation was assembled with performance
specifications vice the more traditional requirements
specifications. A brief explanation of the differences
between these two types of specifications follows:
Performance specifications are expressed in terms of
functions to be performed, i.e., "The grass shall be
kept green and cut to present a well groomed
appearance". By contrast, requirements specifications
define what is to be done in terms of physical
characteristics, i.e. what materials to use, what
processes or methods to use, and other specific
measurable items. The use of detailed requirements
specifications, while offering the advantage of
imposing specific measurable obligations on the
contractor, also limit the contractor because s/he is
required to produce only that which is specified.
Omissions can be costly, and the contractor may not be
able to exercise the discretionary authority to produce
operational effectiveness. For this reason, the
performance outcome, defined as simply as practical, is
advocated by the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (S&L)
because the Government is concerned primarily with the
end-product in services contracting CRef. 7].
Incorporating the use of performance
specifications into the FPAF contract has two stated
goal s
:
1. The performance specifications streamline the
contract requirements.
2. The award fee ostensibly facilitates cooperative
interpretation of the specifications by the
contractor and encourages greater emphasis on the
end results as opposed to the means to achieve
them. CRef. 28]
d. Award Fee Determination Plan
The Fee Determining Official is the Vice
Commander, Western Division, NAVFAC. The Executive
Officer Navy Public Works Center, San Francisco, is the
chairman of the Award Fee Evaluation Committee. The
voting members ^re the Head, North Services Contracts
Branch, at WESTNAVFACENGCOM , the engineering field
detachment; XO, Naval Aviation Depot, and Production
Engineering Head, NAVAVDEP . The Activity Award Fee
Evaluation Committee is chaired by the Resident Officer
in-chai-ge of Construction, PWC San Francisco. Its
members include supervisory QAEs and contract
specialists. The evaluation criteria ^re as follows:
Element Weight
1. Quality of Work ^0%
S. General & Admin. (lump sum) 25*/.
3. Timely Completion of Work 25*/.
^. Cooperation and Attitude 10%
Total 100'/.
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The Award Fee is paid as a lump sum after each quarterly
review, and unearned portions may not be carried forward.
The computations for the fee are the same as outlined in
the previous case, and the "zero fee threshold" for each
criteria is 80'/. as illustrated by the following:
Overall Percentage of Earned
Evaluation Score Award Fee
















95 and above lOOy.
The local Award Fee Determination Board may, at its
discretion, allow the contractor to make verbal
presentation of his performance.
e. QA Staffing and QA Plan
A detailed Quality Assurance Staffing Plan is
included in the contract. It outlines the type of
surveillance for inspections and quality control, the
general tasks QA personnel will perform, and the amount
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of time estimated for each task in the plan. The QA
Staffing Plan provides an reliable picture of the
anticipated QA costs to the Government. This detail-
level plan is not present in the Whiting Field FPAF
contract. In contrast, the FPAF contract at Whiting
Field has estimates of time required for QA in separate
annexes of the QA plan. It does not, however, summarize
the total estimated cost of the Government's QA effort.
In requesting approval for the FPAF contract
solicitation, PWC San Francisco indicated that the
command intended to incorporate extrapolated deductions
in the contract. Extrapolated deductions are deductions
taken for an entire group of contract line-items based on
sample observations. For example, if 1"^ wastebaskets are
to be emptied and the QAE , based on random sampling,
observes three which were not emptied, the schedule of
extrapolated deductions may allow a dollar penalty for
all 1^ of them. This is equivalent to statistical
process control methods used in hardware production. The
Contract Management Officer at PWC San Francisco feels
that extrapolated deductions offer two benefits. First,
the use of random sampling streamlines part of the QA
effort when there is a large amount of work similar in
nature. Second, extrapolated deductions offer fewer
ambiguities than a schedule of generic deductions, and
tend to place most of the QA burden on the contractor,
where it belongs. CRef. 28]
Utilizing a schedule of extrapolated
deductions, three "ranges" of performance may be
identified resulting in three levels of remuneration.
One level would be payment of fixed price only for work
performed at "standard" quality. No part of the award
fee paid. Another level would be payment below fixed
price, using the schedule of extrapolated deductions to
reduce payment amount for sub-standard quality, and the
third level would be payment of the award fee (or part of
it) for work performed above standard. Some deductions
may be taken utilizing the SOED in selected areas while
portions of the award fee may be paid for above standard
performance in other areas. The computations ^rB
performed separately, but the QAE personnel a.r e




There is no history of performance on which
to comment. The contract was selected for this thesis
because it incorporates all of the elements recommended
by NAVFAC for a successful FPAF contract: Award Fee
70
Determination Plan, QA Plan, OA Staffing Plan, and
Schedule of Deductions. Approval for the use of
extrapolated deductions, while requested and favored by
PUIC San Francisco, was not granted by NAVFAC CRef. 29].
A schedule of specific deductions was drafted for use in
the place of extrapolated deductions. Summarily, using
this array of plans is expected to collectively help
define and abate contract transactions costs. The plans
allegedly add clarity to cost analysis by partitioning
and defining areas of specific concern in advance of
contract award. While conclusive evidence as to their
effectiveness is not available in this case, it is felt
that this contract may establish a benchmark upon which
to base the value of other FPAF contracts at PUIC San
Franc i sco .
3 . Grounds Maintenance Contract, Naval Air Station,
North Island Naval Amphibious Base, California
a. Contract Management
The base contract is for 12 months with two
option years. It is the first FPAF contract awarded in
the NAVFAC community to an 8A firm.**^' The fixed price
portion is $817,329. The award fee pool is $32,013. The
^'^A firm operating under the umbrella of the Small
Business Administration is an "8A" firm.
term to which the award fee applies is nine months. The
award fee was added subsequent to the IE month contract
award, so the quarterly amount is $10,671 for nine months
of performance. The strategy for application of the
award fee after contract award in this case is the reason
it is synopsized in this thesis.
Since there was essentially no competition
for award of the contract, market forces which might have
driven down bid prices were not present. Additionally,
historical experience at the activity had been positive
with 8A contractors, and they were expected to be more
responsive to award fee arrangements accordingly. The
intent of the command was to negotiate a two part profit
for the contractor to assure desired performance.
Originally, cost plus a negotiated profit of 5.3V.
represented the fixed price. The award fee was
calculated based on the difference between the negotiated
level of profit and maximum allowable profit (10*/.) over
the same cost base. CRef. 30] The combined effect of the
award fee and the fixed profit margin gives the
Government unilateral control of about '^3.6*/. of the
contractor's total potential profit.
In addition to quality incentives, the award
fee aspect results in extended dialogue between the
7E
Government and the contractor by virtue of the standing
committees^ performance reviews, and weekly QAE
performance reviews. The Facilities Support Contract
Manager points out that using the FPAF contract,
Government is more extensively engaged in contract
performance, and that; for 8A contractors this engagement
may be more helpful than firm fixed price arrangements
where Government contract management is typically less
involved CRef. 301.
The president of the company died just after
contract award. This has contributed to many start-up
problems. The consensus of contracting officials and
customer officials is that better performance has
resulted from the use of the award fee add-on feature
[Ref. 30]. A contract specialist at the activity
expresses the contrar/ view that the amount of contract
administration and QA effort added to the workload for
this contract is not justified by the size of the award
fee CRef. 31]. In other words, the added value in
quality performance may cost more to obtain (vis-^-vis
administrative and QA costs) than the cost of award fee
pool. Following this observation, analysis of available
data reveals the following:
If QA staffing was computed at rates
recommended by the Center for Naval Analysis CRef. 11 :p.
A-2], approximately 1 . "^S FTEs would be needed for QA
.
Again based on the CNA figures, at $33,000 per FTE , the
implied QA effort for this contract would cost the
Government $^8,8-^0; about 15£.(Sy. more than the award fee
poo 1 .
Comparing the $32,013.00 award fee pool with
the implied QA costs of $A-8,8'^0 may provide a useful
decision variable for FPAF contracts vis-^-vis return on
investment. While it is known that the award fee
arrangement requires more QA and administrative effort
than if the contract were firm fixed price, the
incremental cost of QA and administration for the FPAF
contract over the FFP contract is not known. If the
incremental costs of the FPAF contract could be
segregated, a cost-benefit analysis (CBA) would be
appropriate to ascertain the value gained (or lost)
investing in this FPAF arrangement. The CBA approach for
FPAF contracts is a collateral issue in the contract type
selection process and will be briefly addressed in
Chapter V.
b. Contract Performance
During the most recent three review periods
(from 1987 and through March 1988) the contractor has
been awarded portions of the award fee in the amounts of
$3,000; *-0-; and S-^jSOO respectively.
The responsiveness of the contractor in this
case is attributed to the use of the award fee.
Additionally, the added dialogue established by the award
fee is considered timely and useful. The small firm's
management allegedly learns more about its performance
via frequent feedback, contributing to real-time problem
solutions and improved results.
c. Award Fee Determination Plan
The Fee Determining Official ( FDO ) is the
Vice Commander, Uestern Division, NAVFAC . The role of
the FDD is to approve or disapprove the recommendations
of the award fee committee and the award fee board. It
should be noted that the FDO is an individual in the
chain of command with responsibility for the procurement
process. As such, the decision of the FDO regarding the
size of the award fee is equivalent to a contracting
officer's final decision, and is not subject to the
disputes clause in the contract. In this contract, the
Activity Award Fee Evaluation Committee has five members,
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chaired by the Ban Diego Contracting Officer, Naval
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CONTRACTOR'S OVERALL EVALUAT I 0N====== >
Minimum award fee is 57. for an evaluation score of 80,
and the award fee threshold is 79 points, below which no
fee is paid. Five percent is added to the award fee for
every point above 80 in the evaluation score, as in
previously discussed cases. It is interesting to note
that while a performance score of more than 80 warrants
payment of a portion of the award fee, the Award Fee
Determination Plan indicates that performance score below
70 ". . .may be the basis for the Officer in Charge to
initiate termination for default action. "•'^^ This
language implies that performance rated between 70 and 79
points is considered minimally compliant with
specifications. It also implies that the performance
'^quoted from page 5 of Attachment D in contract
N62^7^-86-C-C196
evaluation used in determining the size of the award fee
may also be the basis for other contract-related actions
by the Government. The criteria used for award fee
performance evaluation may be applied more broadly in
managing the contract due to the language of the Award
Fee Plan in this case.
d. Observed Results
The award fee arrangement was applied to the
contract post-award for the unique reasons cited. The
intended effect appears to have been accomplished for two
reasons
:
1. There is more dialogue between contractor and
Government than would occur with a firm fixed price
contract. The weekly performance review meetings,
which would be held in any event, Are augmented by
award fee meetings. The additional contact is seen
as helpful by the ACQ, both for the Government and
for the 8A firm [Ref. 30D.
2. Based on award fee distributions of $7,200 through
three review periods, the Government is receiving
the better performance it desires at a cost which
is 0.9*/. above the fixed price of the contract
through three quarterly reviews. If 100'/. of the
award fee pool were awarded for a fourth quarter,
the total award fee invested for one year would
represent 2.27. added to the fixed price.
^
. Base Operating Services Contract, Naval Submarine
Base, Bangor, Bremerton, Ulashinqton
a. Contract Management
Base contract period is twelve months. The
contract has four option years. The estimated cost of
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performing the contract is *39,000,000 and the award fee
pool IS $2,500,000 ($625,000 per review period). There
15 a "generic" schedule of deductions without
extrapolated elements. The Fee Determining Official is
the Commander, Western Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command. The Chairman of the Performance
Evaluation Board is Commanding Officer, NAVSUBASE
,
Bangor. Voting members are the Public Works Officer,
Senior Officer in the Engineering Field Detachment, Two
Commanding Officers from any of the major tenant
organizations, and the Senior QA Specialist from SUBASE
is the recorder.
The contract is the largest Base Services
contract within NAVFAC . A noteworthy feature of this
case is that the Contracting Department, which is chiefly
responsible for contract administration, is part of an
over-all matrix organization at Bangor. The effect of
this organizational architecture is that QAEs and
contract monitors are not dedicated full time resources.
They perform QA and related functions on an as-required
basis and are "shared" by project managers to perform QA
and monitoring on all of the contracts for the base,
rather than being assigned to a single contract. The
significance of this observation is that it is not
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possible to derive QA costs specific to one contract.
The organizational alignment has an impact on the QA
Staffing Plan inasmuch as the Plan contains merely an
approximation of QA labor costs for the BOS contract. At
the time of this writing, a post-award audit is being
performed by the Naval Audit Service. ^^ That agency has
determined that cost estimates for contract
administration should be identified by individual
contract at Bangor. The results of their dialogue with
officials at Bangor are not final at this time.
The contract was awarded using complete
source selection. There were seven bidders. Contract
type was changed to FPAF during the solicitation process
after approximately ten years of performance using a
fixed price incentive firm (FPIF) arrangement with
another contractor.
b. Contract Performance
The solicitation for the contract was
assembled with the intent to distribute the award fee for
above average performance. This expectation was
*^The post award audit examines contractor
compliance with cost accounting standards, reviewing the
contractor's compensation structure, the accuracy and
reasonableness of contractor's cost representations, and
other necessary audit functions. Results of this audit
may be helpful for further research regarding FPAF contracts
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emphasized in the solicitation. The character of FPAF
performance evaluation by the Government became pivotal
early in the history of this contract, when, at the first
Award Fee Board meeting, the contractor's se 1 f-eva 1 ua t i on
was very high and the Government evaluation of the
contractor was "average". The Board concluded that an
award of no fee was warranted.
There were two observations noted by the AGO
regarding this disparity in observed performance. First,
the format used by the contractor and that used by the
Government for presentation to the AF Board were
different. This led to mi scommunicat i on at the board
meeting; e.g., "I don't recall your having said that we
were deficient in this ar&a. What you said was, "'we
were improving....'" The recommended solution was that a
common format should have been used by both parties
presenting their performance evaluations to the Board.
This in fact has been implemented. CRef. 3S]
Second, communication up and down the chain
of command regarding contractor performance was not
viewed as effective during the first review period.
"Taking the pain to communicate what the Government
wants..." to the contractor and ensuring adequate
documentation of that communication were steps seen as
lacking at that time CRef. 33].
Insofar as no award fee was approved for the
first quarter of performance, the contractor, United
Airline Services Corporation, allegedly earned no profit.
The company had bid the contract as if it were cost
reimbursable. In other words. United Airlines bid a
"zero base fee" CRef. 33]. The company proposed to make
its profit on the award fee provisions of the contract.
The company contends that competition forced them to take
that approach, and, "...most other contractors would do
the same." [Ref. 333.
The contractor's response to the inherent
cost-risk in its strategy was:
I think all contractors try to measure risk, but it is
almost impossible on a fixed-price service-type
contract, because the PWS in most cases is not defined
in sufficient detail to allow for numerical measuring
risk. What we depend on is the "reasonableness" of our
customer evaluators. This leads to all types of
conflicts and compromises in the managing of service-
type contracts sometimes CRef. 33].
c. Award Fee Determination Plan
The title given to performance monitors in
the matrix organization at Bangor is Technical
Representative of the Commanding Officer ( TRCQ ) . Most
TRCOs perform this duty on a collateral basis. The QA
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organization has 18 TRCOs , 18 assistant TRCOs , and 36
contract monitors. QA reports from the TRCOs are
forwarded to the Assistant Officer in Charge (Contracts
Department) for collation and analysis. There are four
evaluation criteria in the award fee plan:
ELEMENT WEIGHT
1 ) Overall Pro.ject Management 15
-cooperation and responsiveness
-effectiveness in problem solving
including degree of reliance
on government
2) Administration 20




of reports, records, and submittals
3
)
Contractor's Quality Control 30
-Overall quality of work
-Inspection and record keeping
-Accurate deductions on invoices




-Response to emergency, routine
ser V ice calls
-Response to indefinite Quantity
delivery orders
-Effective scheduling and accom-
plishment of remaining contract
work
TOTAL 100
The minimum performance score for the contractor to
attain a portion of the award fee is 77. The fee is
computed in accordance with the following formula:
Max. award fee payable X Contractor's overall
or the period eval. score minus 76
d. Observed Results
The contractor and the Contracting Officer
maintain that there has been considerable
misunderstanding in the discharge of the contract. The
contractor feels that issues which caused those
misunderstandings were administrative in nature, and
therefore did not affect the final outcome in terms of
performance. Based on that contention, he asserts that a
portion of the award fee was earned by his company during
the first review period, and that the Government's
evaluation was not accurate. He notes that while the
learning curve in the process caused loss of the award
fee in the first review period, his efforts and the
efforts of his company remain directed toward customer
satisfaction. He further maintains that improvement in
dialogue is a key factor in his ability to respond to his
customer and that this is in fact happening. [Ref. 3-^3
S3
The contractor's operations director noted that the
company bid on the contract despite reservations about
the contract type. He voices the view that fixed price
contracts "of any type" avB not appropriate for service-
type contracts because:
1. Generally PWS are not well defined
2. [contractor] has less flexibility
3. Costs more (more risk to contractor)
^. Not as responsive to local needs as most bases need
[Ref. 33]
The Administrative Contracting Officer (ACQ),
offering his perspective, contends that FPAF contracts,
if written and structured properly, are not more
difficult to administer than firm fixed price contracts,
either in this or other cases. He qualifies this
observation saying that 0MB standards for QA and contract
administration seem understated, and that inadequate
manpower could create problems administering this large
contract. He maintains that the method for i ncent i v i z i ng
contractor performance with FPAF contracts affords the
Government more flexibility at reasonable cost, and that
the use of FPAF contracts is appropriate for base
services CRef. 32]. If Bangor awards the contractor 100*/.
of the award fee pool for the remaining three quarters of
performance in FY88, the cost of the award fee will total
8-^
^.8*/. of the fixed price. Based on the pronouncement made
by the contractor regarding zero-base fixed price, this
would equate to ^.8*/. profit before taxes. Two
observations are offered here:
1. The actual cost of the award fee, based on
evaluation of performance, is typically lower than
the funded amount. While this is not particularly
revealing, it demonstrates the Government's intent
to set funds aside to pay for excellent quality,
but not distribute those funds unless results
warrant
.
2. The forces of competition have (allegedly) placed
the Government at advantage in this FPAF
arrangement through the process of one or more
competitors "gaming" the award fee during contract
competition. In other words, furnishing the
Government more predilection over profit because
the award fee was bid as profit.
C. SUMMARY
The observations derived from the four cases
described in this chapter suggest that the Government is
getting a positive return on investment for FPAF
contracts, and that they arB superior to firm fixed price
contracts for base services.
The importance of ver i f y inq the amount by which the
return on investment has improved by means of the use of
FPAF contracts is made manifest insofar as 0MB, through
the budgetary process, has taken significant advance
budget reductions in anticipation of CA cost comparison
completions [Ref. 35]. The increased need to identify
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new areas for CA cost comparisons (and hence a clear
picture of "best" contract options) has hence been made
more compelling for Base Commanders as the reductions
will be passed on to them eventually.
While the FY 88 Defense Authorization bill gives
Commanders the option to make review determinations for
cost comparisons, it would appear on evidence that the
Executive Branch (0MB) has limited their options in this
regar d
.
As illustrated by the cases, there is divergence
between 0MB standards for calculating certain
transactions costs (such as QA ) and observed transactions
costs in the field. Absent some of those conflicts, the
cost/benefit picture of FPAF contracts would be clearer .
Chapter V expands on the observed findings concerning
the FPAF issue in terms of independent conclusions and
recommendat ions
.
V. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMNENDftT I 0N5
A. CONCLUSIONS
The primary purpose of this thesis has been to
investigate the suitability of fixed price award fee
contracts for commercial activities. This was
accomplished through an extensive search of literature,
interviews with personnel involved at operating level and
policy level, and a study of FPAF contracts in use within
Naval Facilities Engineering Command. Based on the
information gathered, the researcher proposes the
following CA program changes.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 . Introduce More Cost Realism in the CA Process.
The Government seems to have confused the
meanings of the words "value" and "cost". Uh i 1 e it may
be sufficient to argue that "value" is not always
expressed in dollar terms, the value of the CA program is
being judged by legislators and 0MB solely in terms of
dollar outlays saved. The researcher concludes that
these savings are overstated.
Cost realism is the best vehicle to form a
baseline for CA program evaluation. In order to assess
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the value of the CA program in dollar terms, all costs
incurred by the Government in creating a private market
for public goods must be included. If this were the
case, return on investment may be reasonably estimated.
Evidence points out that this is not possible because
Circular A-76 and its subordinate Cost Comparison
Handbook define specific methods for computing costs
which are not comprehensive enough. The procedures for
determining contract administration costs, quality
assurance costs, permanent change of station costs,
inventory costs, and fringe benefits should be reviewed.
Recently, U.S. Congressmen Ackerman and Ford
asked the GAO to examine a contract awarded for base
operating services at Ulhidbey Island, Washington. Their
request was in response to allegations from the American
Federation of Government Employees (AFGE) that the cost
comparison process was biased in favor of the contractor
CRef. 36)1. GAO found that the cost estimating procedures
used were not inconsistent with 0MB standards. CRef
.
36:p. 1] The concerns of the AFGE are nonetheless
legitimate insofar as there is evidence to show that 0MB
standards may be inaccurate in selected categories,
particularly contract administration costs, contract




Consider Changes to A-76 and Implementing
Directives Uhich UJould ftllo^^) Greater Flexibility
for Commanders to Consider Alternative Contract
Types in the Cost-Comparison Process.
GAO stated that a bias may exist in favor of a
contractor in competition with the Government for an
award fee contract because the award fee pool is not
allowed to be included in the cost comparison. For this
reason, NAVFAC has stated that FPAF contracts are not
appropriate for CAs undergoing cost-comparison. If the
activity under study is to be contracted-out, all of the
business tools available for negotiating a cost effective
contract acguisition should be at its disposal. These
business tools include alternative contract types.
Regarding GAOs observations on possible
inequities in the use of FPAF contracts for CAs, 0MB
rules regarding allocable and allowable costs and cost
elements (such as award fee pools) in the cost comparison
process should be reviewed. It may be possible to
compare performance by considering the award fee pool in
the contractor's bid, or by developing an equitable way
to compare Government and contractor performance with an
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award fee pool added to both bids. For example, the
Government does have some discretionary authority to
produce "awards" for its employees. Quality step
increases, suggestion awards, and other cash incentive
programs are designed to encourage quality production.
This basic set of incentives exists to accomplish the
same results in-house as the award fee pool for
contracted performance. However, these are not addressed
in A-76 implementing directives. If the Government is
prepared to incentivize performance with dollar awards,
it may be worth considering the use of award fee pools
for in-house performance. The effect of such a policy
would tend to put contracted effort and in-house effort
on a more even footing vis-^-vis cost comparison,
operational effectiveness, and cost efficiency.
3 . In Nritinq Solicitations for FPAF Contracts,
Limit the Contractors" Ability to "Game" the
Award Fee.
The award fee is not intended to be ordinary
profit for the contractor. It is an incentive intended
to encourage performance above standard and hence, above
ordinary profit margins. The observations stated in this
thesis support the notion that contractors assume they
will earn a portion of the award fee (or all of it)
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consistently, and they bid accordingly. Moreover,
contractors also seem to feel that in an award fee
solicitation, this approach is their only option
considering the forces of competition. This action would
bias the cost comparison process because the Government
cannot compete for an award fee, and the parties would be
bidding on essentially different standards.
One way to alleviate part of the situation
described here is to structure the solicitation
differently. For example, offer an award fee pool of
"...between zero and ten percent..." of the negotiated
price. The actual amount to be fixed after source
selection. This option is supported by the Director of
Contract Pricing, Assistant Secretary of the Navy ( S&L
)
CRef. 19]. The principle benefit to this mechanism would
be to encourage contractors to submit more realistic
bids; relying less on guesswork and gaming and more on
cost realism in bidding the competition, especially if
the competition is the Government.
^. Modify OPNAV Instruction ^B60.7B, PERFORMANCE OF
COMMERCIAL ACTIVITIES to Include A Discussion of
Navy Policy Regarding Alternative Contract Types
for CAs.
CA policy and contracting policy will continue to
have important impacts on the support missions performed
at bases in DoD. The contracting regulations which
directly impact the CA program (such as how and when to
use certain contract types) should be addressed via
policy doctrine in the CA implementing directive,
4860. 7B. Alternatively, the relevant procurement
regulations could be referenced at the beginning of the
i nstr uc t i on
.
In any case, the interaction of the contracting
discipline and CA discipline will become more visible as
Executive Order 12615 is implemented, bringing a greater
number of functions under contracted performance.
Planning for this eventuality, it is recommended that the
Chief of Naval Operations, (OP ^^3), establish a liaison
with the Navy Competition Advocate to discuss
incorporating appropriate contracting guidance in the
basic CA directive.
5 . FPAF Contracts ftre Superior to Firm Fixed Pr i ce
Contracts For the Performance of Base Services.
The matters which give rise to the seven
commercial activities performance issues relate directly
to the use of FPAF contracts insofar as FPAF contracts
expand the performance horizon, abbreviate specifications
complexities, espouse better communication, and offer
greater flexibility to both Government and Contractor.
Some problems in the CA program may be abated
using FPAF contracts vice firm fixed price contracts, but
structural barriers regarding contr ac t- type selection for
CAs should be examined by the Navy Competition Advocate.
This action could be a precursor to a class deviation
from FAR granting blanket approval for use of FPAF
contracts, and is in consonance with the acquisition
streamlining programs now being pursued by DoD.
Evidence indicates that the award fee contract
improves relations between Government and Contractor in
the cases examined. Discussions between parties tended
more toward end results in performance rather than the
means to achieve them. The PWS became a more succinct
summary of expected results, insofar as the contractor
was motivated to deliver what the Government needed, not
just what it specified.
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Quality performance became an item higher on the
agenda for the contractor, and in the given examples, the
award fee portion of the contract is directly
attributable for increased quality. In one case, the
award fee was consistently distributed almost 100 percent
to the contractor, but he expressed unbridled willingness
to invest in capital and labor where necessary to
continue quality performance because of the award fee.
In other cases, the award fee contract was buying better
quality allegedly at about the same cost as firm fixed
price contracts due to two factors:
1. The forces of competition tend to drive-down the
fixed price portion of the bid in anticipation of
earning part of the fee (irrespective of the
"gaming" factor).
2. The positive effect of rewarding excellent
performance has a psychological advantage over the
negative aspect of having funds deducted for less
than adequate performance. Contractors tended to
structure bids in consideration of this, and made
visible efforts to please the customer command.
Source selection processes used for FPAF
contracts alleviate the liklihood of problems indigenous
to sealed-bid contract awards, and reduce considerably
the probability of contractors buying-in.
The intangible benefits of FPAF contracts cannot
be shown to contribute to CA program savings by the
analytical techniques used in this thesis. However,
without a broader application of accounting principles
9^
vis-^-^is allowable and allocable CA program costs,
actual CA program savings remain indeterminate. While
increased savings may precipitate from better quality and
better value with FPAF contracts as a vehicle, there does
not appear to be enough evidence to quantify the added
savings
.
Concluding: Within the scope of this thesis, the
benefits appear to outweigh the costs of FPAF contracts
for commercial activities under the right conditions of




It is recommended that further research be
conducted regarding the cost-benefit approach to
selection of contract type for commercial activities.
The researcher sees a need to establish a greater degree
of cost realism for the CA program in order to accurately
assess the potential for return on investment. Answering
questions about the decision variables in the contract
selection process and quantifying those variables may
offer more useful indices of performance than a.re
available currently.
APPENDIX DOCID 1750T
AWARD FEE DETERMINATION PLAN (AFDP)
A. INTRODUCTION
1. This plan covers the administration of the award fee provisions of
Contract No. N62474-
General Information
a. The base contract period and the term to which this plan applies
months commencing . This contract has four
option years. In the event an option year is exercised, a new (revised) plan
must be approved by the Fee Determination Official (FDO) for that option
period. The new plan must be submitted to the Contracting Officer (WESTDIV)
for transmittal to the FDO at least thirty (30) calendar days prior to the
start date of the option period. Any resulting changes to the contract
provision "AWARD FEE EVALUATION," in Section E of the contract, must be made
by unilateral modification and forwarded to the contractor at least fifteen
(15) calendar days prior to the start of the option period.
b. Each award fee period lasts three (3) months. Evaluations will be
conducted at the end of each award fee period in accordance with Part C of
this plan.
c. The estimated cost of performing the contract is $ .
d. The award fee pool is $ .
e. The award fee pool is a fixed amount and is not subject to
variances in ordering of work or changes made pursuant to the "CHANGES - FIXED
PRICE ALTERNATE 11" clause in Section I of the contract.
f. The award fee earned and payable will be determined each period by
the Fee Determination Official in accordance with this plan.
g. /Ward fee determinations are not subject to the "DISPUTES" clause
in Section I of the contract.
h. In accordance with Part D, paragraph D.2c, the FDO may unilaterally
make changes to this plan that do not otherwise require mutual agreement under
the contract.
B. ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE FOR AWARD FEE ADMINISTRATION
1. The following organizational structure is established for
administering the award fee provisions of the contract:
a. Fee Determination Official (FDO)
The FDO is the Commander, Western Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command.
(1) Primary FDO responsibilities are:
(a) Review findings and recommendations of the Award Fee
Determination Board, the Contractor's self evaluation and any other source of
information deemed pertinent.
(b) Determine the award fee earned and payable for each
evaluation period as addressed in Part C.
(c) Document determination of the amount of award fee earned
for each period in an Award Fee Determination Report (AFDR).
(d) Change matters covered in this plan as adressed in Part D
as appropriate.
b. Award Fee Determination Board
(1) The Chairperson of the Board is:
The following are voting members:
(a)
(b)
[The Chairperson may recommend the appointment of non-voting members to
assist the Board in performing its functions.]
(2) Primary responsibilities of the Board are:
(a) Review the evaluations submitted by the Activity Award Fee
Evaluation Committee for the evaluation" (performance) period.
(b) Prepare an Award Fee Determination Report (AFUR) for
submission to the FDO for each evaluation (performance) period, as addressed
in Part C of this plan.
(c) Consider proposed changes to this plan and recommend
adoption to the FDO, if appropriate, as addressed in Part D of this plan.
(3) Specific functions of the Board Chairperson &re:
(a) Coordinate efforts of the Board to ensure the timely
review and evaluation of reports submitted by the activity Award Fee
Evaluation Committee, activity Performance Monitors and the Contractor.
(b) Ensure that all board members get copies of all evaluation
(performance) reports; a copy of the contract with all modifications thereto;
and a copy of this plan and any changes made in accordance with Part D of this
plan.
(c) Ensure that the AFDR is completed and submitted to the FDO
in a timely manner.
(d) As appropriate, request and obtain performance information
from other units or personnel normally involved.
c. Activity Award Fee Evaluation Committee
(1) The Chairperson of the Activity Evaluation Committee will be
either the OIC or a representative designated by him.
(2) This Cormittee will monitor, evaluate and assess the
Contractor's performance based upon the criteria elements listed elsewhere
herein.
(3) The Comnittee will meet and make specific performance
evaluations each month during the evaluation (performance) period. Chce,
e\fery three months, the Committee will submit a formal evaluation report to
the AFDB. The Committee report will include a recommendation as to the
numerical grade rating to be assigned, which shall be a measure of the
Contractor's performance for the three-month evaluation period. A copy of the
Committee's report will be furnished to the Contractor.
(4) The OIC will assign a Performance Monitor (PM) for each
performance area to be evaluated under the contract. PMs shall be selected on
the basis of their expertise (administrative or technical) relative to the
prescribed performance areas. Duties of PMs will be in addition to, or an
extension oip, their normal responsibilities. PMs shall be appointed as member
of the Activity Evaluation Committee.
(5) The Committee will meet with the Contractor on a monthly basis
to discuss his overall performance.
(6) The Committee Chairperson will ensure that all committee
members and/or PMs receive the following:
(a) A copy of the contract and all modifications.
(b) A copy of this plan and any changes made in accordance
with Part D.
(c) Appropriate orientation and guidance.
(d) Specific instructions applicable to PM assigned
performance areas.
d. Performance Monitors (PMs)
(1) A PM will be assigned to each performance area to be
evaluated. The assignment will be made by the OIC or his representative
designated as Committee Chairperson.
(2) Each PM will be responsible for complying with any specific
instructions from the Committee Chairperson. Primary PM responsibilities will
be to:
(a) Monitor, evaluate and assess Contractor performance in
assigned performance areas in accordance with the criteria elements listed
elsewhere herein.
(b) Submit a monthly Performance Monitor Report (PMR) to the
OIC or designated Committee Chairperson. The ?AR must address the criteria
elements for each performance area assigned, providing a narrative rationale
to support the evaluation for each criteria element. When requested, PMs
should be prepared to make verbal presentations to the OIC or the Committee
Chairperson.
with Part 0.
(c) Recommend appropriate changes to this plan in accordance
C. EVALUATION REQUIREMENTS
1 . Evaluation Criteria and Numerical Rating
a. The award fee determination criteria for the award fee period of
through is identified below:
Criteria Element
1 . Qual ity of Work
2. Contractor Response to Emergency
and Priority Service Calls
3. Timely Completion of Work
4. Required Reports and Submittals
Prepared in Proper Format
Submitted in a Timely Manner












Excellent The best performance that could be
expected by any Contractor. Contractor
consistently exceeds the expected




88 - 94 Very Good Additional effort is required for the
Contractor to perfom at a superior
level. Contractor consistently meets
and normally exceeds the expected
performance level for the criteria
elements with no major performance
problems noted.
80 - 87 Good Constractor normally meets or exceeds
most of the expected performance levels
for the criteria elements. The
Contractor's overall performance should
be rated as above average. The
Contractor normally performs at a level
where no major performance problems are
noted, and very few minor problems ire
noted.
71 - 79 Marginal Contractor partially meets the expected
performance level for the criteria
elements. Performance is in general,
inconsistent. Minor problems exist
througnout most of the criteria
elements, along with occasional major
problems. Performance at this level
will likely support the issuance of a
Xure Motice.
Below 70 Unsatisfactory Consistently fails to meet the expected
performance level for the criteria
elements. Major performance
deficiencies exist. Performance may be
basis for the Officer in Charge to
initiate termination for default action.
2. Computation of Evaluation Score
a. Each criteria element is individually rated with a numerical
score. The score is then multiplied by the relative weight of the criteria
element. The sum of the scores for all criteria elements will yield the
overall evaluation score as follows:
Criteria
Element Weight








[X] Score = .Point Value
4. Reports Prep. /Submission .10
5. Cooperation & Ingenuity .10
Contractor's Overall Evaluation Score =
3. Evaluation Periods and Maximum Available Award Fee
a. The maximum award fee for the base contract year is $_
b. There are four evaluation periods. The duration of each
evaluation period is three (3) months with the first period beginning on the
contract start date (immediately after the phase-in period). The portion of
the award fee available for each quarterly evaluation shall be in accordance
with the following schedule:





4. Payment of Award Fee
a. The award fee for each period shall be computed as follows:
Maximim /Ward Fee Percentage of Fee Fee Available
Available for X Available = for the period
Base Contract Year
X .25 =
b. The Contractor's overall evaluation score when compared to the
Award Fee Schedule shown below, will determine the percentage of earned award
fee to be paid the Contractor during the evaluation period.
c. /Ward Fee Schedule . The following schedule establishes the
percent of fee to be awarded tor the overall evaluation score.
Overall Percentage of Earned /Sward Fee for
Evaluation Score Evaluation Period
















95 and above 100%
d. The earned award fee shall be paid as a lump sum after each
quarterly evaluation period.
e. Any unearned portion of the award fee for an evaluation period
will not be carried over to the next evaluation period.
5. Evaluation Procedures
a. A determination of the award-fee earned for each evaluation period
will be made promptly by the FDO at the end of each period. The method to be
followed is described below:
(1) Within seven (7) calendar days following the end of each
month, except the final month of the evaluation period, the activity
Evaluation Corunittee Chairperson shall meet with the Contractor to discuss his
performance during the period as part of the Government's ongoing quality
assurance effort. PMs and other personnel involved in performance evaluations
should attend these meetings and participate in discussions. Within seven (7)
calendar days after the close of the evaluation period, the activity
Evaluation Committee Chairperson will consolidate the Committee's monthly
reports and submit a formal evaluation report, along with the Contractor's
self-evaluation report the AFDB. These reports should be forwarded to reach
the AFDB within twelve (12) calendar days after the close of the evaluation
period. When requested, the activity OIC or Evaluation Committee Chairperson
should be prepared to make a verbal presentation of the Cornnittee's report
before the AFDB.
(2) After receipt of the above mentioned reports, the AFDB may at
its discretion, allow the Contractor to make a verbal presentation of his
performance. The purpose of such a presentation is to allow the Contractor an
opportunity to provide input to the AFDB before the Board formalizes and
submits its evaluation report to the FDO.
(3) Within fifteen (15) calendar days following the close of each
evaluation period, the AFD8 will meet and consider all Contractor performance
information received and prepare a written report summarizing the Board's
findings and recomendations. The report should be a consensus of all voting
board merrters. Each voting menter shall sign the AFDB report to indicate
agreement. Each criteria element shall be addressed with narrative rationale
to support the numerical ratings and overall evaluation score. The report
shall also include the recomnended award fee amount. If a voting meirter
disagrees with the numerical rating for one or more of the criteria elements,
a minority report may be written by that member to address his/her reasons for
the disagreement. The AFDB report and any minority reports will be forwarded
to the Contracting Officer (WESTDIV) for transmittal to the FDO.
(4) The AFDB shall notify the Contractor of the results of the
evaluation by forwarding a copy of the Board's report to the Contractor.
Within seven (7) days after receipt of the Board's report, the Contractor may
submit a written response to the report to the Contracting Officer (WESTDIV)
for transmittal to the FDO.
(5) The FDO will consider the Board's report, the Contractor's
self-evaluation (if submitted) and any other information deemed pertinent.
(6) The FDO will determine the amount of the award fee earned
during the period. The amount determined will not result solely from
mathematical sunning, averaging or the application of a formula. The FDD's
aetermination will be stated in AFDR. Tnis report will also provide invoicing
instructions to the Contractor. The AFDR will be furnished the Contractor
aoproximately fourteen (14) calendar days after receipt of the AFDB report and
will not be subject to the "Disputes" clause in the contract.
D. CHANGES IN PLAN COVERAGE
1 . Right to Make Unilateral Changes
Any matters covered in this plan not otherwise requiring mutual
agreement under the contract, except the designated FDO, may be changed
unilaterally by the FDO prior to the beginning of an evaluation period by
timely notice to the Contractor in writing. The changes will be made without
formal modification of the contract.
2. Method for Changing Plan Coverage
The method to be followed for changing plan coverage is described
below:
a. Personnel involved in the administration of the award fee
provisions of the contract are encouraged to recommend changes in plan
_
coverage with a view toward changing management emphases, motivating higher
performance levels, or improving the award fee determination process.
Recommended changes should be sent to the AFDB for consideration and drafting.
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b. At least 21 calendar days prior to the end of each evaluation
period, the AFDB will submit changes applicable to the next evaluation period
for approval by the FDO with appropriate comments and justification, or inform
the FDO that no changes are recommended for the next period.
c. Any resulting changes to the contract provision entitled "AWARD
FEE EVALUATION," in Section E of the contract, must be made by unilateral
modification and forwarded to the Contractor at least ten (10) calendar days
before the beginning of each evaluation period, the FDO will notify the
Contractor in writing if there are no changes. If the Contractor is not
provided with this notification, or if the notification is not provided within
the agreed-to nunter of calendar days before the beginning of the next period,
the existing plan coverage will continue in effect for the next evaluation
period.
d. Notification at a later date or alteration of criteria (including
added criteria) after an award fee period has begun must be agreed to by both
parties.
NOTES
1. Enter the Attachment Nunber at the top of the page.
2. Nunter pages to coincide with other Section J page numbering.
3. Part A - Introduction
a. Paragraph 1 : Enter the contract nunter; type of service contract,
i.e., Housing Maintenance; and the activity name and location.
b. Paragraph 2 : Enter the nunter of months of the base contract period,
i.e., twelve (12); also enter the contract start date.
c. Subparagraph 2c : Enter the contract amount.
d. Subparagraph 2d : Enter the amount of the award fee pool.
4. Part B - Organizational Structure for Award Fee Administration . Enter in
Subparagraph lb. Award Fee Determination Board , the titles of Board members.
Do not enter names.
5. Part C - Evaluation Requirements . Enter in Subparagraph la the dates of
the evaluation period (three month period).
6. Computation of Evaluation Score
a. For each criteria element, the Contractor should be given a numerical
rating from Subparagraph 5b, Part C .
b. ConputatTon of Evaluation Sccre : Exanpl
Criteria
Element Weight [X] Score = Point Value
1 .35 90 31.5
2 .15 90 13.5
3 .30 100 30.0







7. Criteria elements for evaluation should be selected based upon type of
service being procured.
8. SubDaraoraoh 32, Part C: Enter the maximum award fee for the base period,
i.e., $200,000.00.
9. Subparagraph 3b, Part C : Enter the percentage of fee available for each
evaluation period (four [4] periods), i.e., 25%. These percentages are not
static. The OIC or Contracting Officer may want to allow the Contractor a
larger percentage in the first period than in the fourth period, i.e., 30, 25,
25, 20.
10. Paragraon i. Part C :
a. Computation of the award fee earned during the evaluation period:
Example
$200,000.00 Max. A^ard Fee Available (Base Period)
X ^ Percentage of Fee Available
$ 50,000.00 Fee Available for the Period
b. In the example above, the Cntractor earned an overall evaluation score
of 93. By comparing this to the /Sward Fee Schedule in Subparagrpah 4b, Part C,
it can be determined that the Contractor earned 90% of the fee available for
the period, or ($50,000 x .90) $45,000.
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